Teorie redistribučních systémů
[Theory of Redistribution Systems]
Theory of redistribution systems is an application and at the same time extension of Game Theory. It deals with functioning of institutions, establishments, firms and others social systems, in that pay-offs are redistributed in contrast to achievement of individual players. The redistribution is usually allowed by a coalition, formed inside of redistribution system, that disposes of dominance over the pay-offs´ redistribution. Model of Elementary Redistribution System composes of three players bringing interesting and usable knowledge. The achievements of players are divided in the rate of simple numbers. Redistribution equation describing all possibilities of pay-offs´ redistribution in Elementary Redistribution System and enabling to create and to test a computerized model of Elementary Redistribution System. Based on that, it is possible to model different types of bargaining, kinds of equilibrium - including Pareto optionality and Nash equilibrium - and in connection with it also chaining of simple redistribution systems into the combined ones. Model of Elementary Redistribution System is possible to extend into many branches and use it for description of behaviour of realistic social systems, especially by solving problems concerning the possibility to increase efficiency of its functioning.
Volume (Year): 2009 (2009)
Issue (Month): 5 ()
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- Bryan Caplan, 2007. "Introduction to The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies," Introductory Chapters,in: The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies Princeton University Press.
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