IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

T-forms of Organization Revisited and A Trans-disciplinary Framework for Institutional Analysis


  • Masahiko Aoki


In the first part of this paper, the idea of T-form of organization, as opposed to A-form and J-form, due to O.E.Williamson is revisited. According to him, T denotes temporary, transitional, or timeliness. The paper identifies the clustering of entrepreneurial firms as observed in Silicon Valley as an instance of T-form and examines conditions under which it can be informationally more efficient than the integrated A-form (functional hierarchy) or J-form (information-sharing). It also formulates an essential aspect of the Silicon Valley phenomena as a tournament game among entrepreneurial firm judged by the venture capitalist and explores conditions under which option value and externalities created by the tournament can exceed the cost of multiple financing of firms competing in developmental design. The second part of the paper suggests a game-theoretic approach to broaden the Williamsonian framework for comparative institutional analysis. Specifically it suggests analytical ways to integrate economic, political and sociological approaches to institutions, using linked games and strategic complementarity analysis.

Suggested Citation

  • Masahiko Aoki, 2003. "T-forms of Organization Revisited and A Trans-disciplinary Framework for Institutional Analysis," Discussion papers 03004, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
  • Handle: RePEc:eti:dpaper:03004

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1990. "Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1255-1277, November.
    2. Jacques Cremer, 1980. "A Partial Theory of the Optimal Organization of a Bureaucracy," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(2), pages 683-693, Autumn.
    3. Masahiko Aoki & Hirokazu Takizuwa, 2013. "Information, Incentives, and Option Value: The Silicon Valley Model," Chapters,in: Comparative Institutional Analysis, chapter 7, pages 72-104 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eti:dpaper:03004. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (MATSUKURA, Taeko). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.