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The Insurance Premium in the Interest Rates of Interlinked Loans in a Small-scale Fishery

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  • Marie-Catherine Riekhof

    () (ETH Zurich, Switzerland)

Abstract

Interest payments based on income flows are a common feature of informal loans. Such so-called `interlinked loans' can be seen as an insurance against very low disposable incomes, as interest payments are lowest when income turns out to be low. This paper examines whether interlinked loans indeed contain an insurance premium and how those premia are determined. A simple theoretical model predicts that interest rates of interlinked loans increase with income volatility when insurance premia exist. Based on data from a small-scale fishery in India, calculations show that on average, lenders receive 25% of the income, which corresponds to an average interest rate of 49% p.a.. A panel data analysis confirms theoretical predictions that interlinked loans contain an insurance component paid by the borrowers.

Suggested Citation

  • Marie-Catherine Riekhof, 2016. "The Insurance Premium in the Interest Rates of Interlinked Loans in a Small-scale Fishery," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 16/264, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
  • Handle: RePEc:eth:wpswif:16-264
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

    Interlinked loan; Insurance premium; Interest rate; Small-scale fishery; Informal insurance; Informal credit markets; Interlinked contracts; Risk-sharing; India;

    JEL classification:

    • O16 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives

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