The Impact of Connectivity on Market Interlinkages: Evidence from Rural Punjab
Up to the 1980s it was generally accepted that many key issues in agrarian development could not be studied without an understanding of market interlinkages. Recently, however, this theory has lost its importance in development literature. Based on a household-level survey from rural Pakistan, this paper seeks to re-introduce the importance of interlinkages by illustrating their exploitative potential, particularly in unequal isolated villages where landlords are essentially monopolist/monopsonist. The solution proposed is to break isolation. Making use of an exogenous shock found in the construction of a motorway, the study finds that while connectivity does not break interlinkages completely, it does significantly reduce their exploitative nature.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Sohi, R.S. & Chahal, S.S., 2004. "Interlinked Credit Transactions in Rural Punjab," Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics, Indian Society of Agricultural Economics, vol. 59(1).
- Bell, Clive, 1988. "Credit markets and interlinked transactions," Handbook of Development Economics,in: Hollis Chenery & T.N. Srinivasan (ed.), Handbook of Development Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 16, pages 763-830 Elsevier.
- Swaminathan, Madhura, 1991. "Segmentation, Collateral Undervaluation, and the Rate of Interest in Agrarian Credit Markets: Some Evidence from Two Villages in South India," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(2), pages 161-178, June.
- Basu, Kaushik, 1983. "The Emergence of Isolation and Interlinkage in Rural Markets," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 35(2), pages 262-280, July.
- Basu, Kaushik, 1986. "One Kind of Power," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(2), pages 259-282, July.
- Naqvi, Nadeem & Wemhoner, Frederick, 1995. "Power, coercion, and the games landlords play," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 191-205, August.
- Hatlebakk, Magnus, 2002.
"A new and robust subgame perfect equilibrium in a model of triadic power relations,"
Journal of Development Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 225-232, June.
- Hatlebakk, M., 2000. "A New and Robust Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in a Model of Triadic Power Relations," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen 2400, Department of Economics, University of Bergen.
- Bardhan, Pranab K, 1980. "Interlocking Factor Markets and Agrarian Development: A Review of Issues," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 32(1), pages 82-98, March.
- Aleem, Irfan, 1990. "Imperfect Information, Screening, and the Costs of Informal Lending: A Study of a Rural Credit Market in Pakistan," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 4(3), pages 329-349, September.
- George Akerlof, 1976. "The Economics of Caste and of the Rat Race and Other Woeful Tales," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 90(4), pages 599-617. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:40:y:2012:i:5:p:999-1012. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.