One Kind of Power
In standard models in economics, indi viduals interact pairwise. Allowing for "triadic" relations explains concepts like power and influence, which have been considered in economics only periphera lly. This paper constructs three illustrations of power, all relying on triadic relations. The first demonstrates how unwanted regimes could persist because of interpersonal conjectures. The second shows how a laborer in backward agricultur e may agree to an exchange with a landlord, from which he gets negative utility. The third formalizes our notion of "an influential man," and tries to explain his existence. Copyright 1986 by Royal Economic Society.
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Volume (Year): 38 (1986)
Issue (Month): 2 (July)
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