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Implications of Agency Theory for Optimal Land Tenure Contracts

Listed author(s):
  • Huffman, Wallace E
  • Just, Richard E

Explores landowner-tenant contracts in land tenure in agriculture. Inefficiency of share tenancy relative to owner cultivation; Introduction of principal-agent models; Influence of monitoring in studying optimal landowner-tenant risk sharing; Need to study adequate tenant incentives

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File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/420685
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Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Economic Development and Cultural Change.

Volume (Year): 52 (2004)
Issue (Month): 3 (April)
Pages: 617-642

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Handle: RePEc:ucp:ecdecc:y:2004:v:52:i:3:p:617-42
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/EDCC/

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  2. Braverman, Avishay & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1982. "Sharecropping and the Interlinking of Agrarian Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(4), pages 695-715, September.
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  5. Gary S. Becker, 1994. "Age, Earnings, Wealth, and Human Capital," NBER Chapters,in: Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis with Special Reference to Education (3rd Edition), pages 228-244 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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  7. Just, Richard E & Zilberman, David, 1983. "Stochastic Structure, Farm Size and Technology Adoption in Developing Agriculture," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 35(2), pages 307-328, July.
  8. Avinash Dixit, 2002. "# Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretative Review," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 37(4), pages 696-727.
  9. Quibria, M. G. & Rashid, Salim, 1984. "The puzzle of sharecropping: A survey of theories," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 103-114, February.
  10. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1987. "Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(2), pages 303-328, March.
  11. Gary S. Becker, 1994. "Investment in Human Capital: Rates of Return," NBER Chapters,in: Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis with Special Reference to Education (3rd Edition), pages 59-160 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Robert Gibbons, 1998. "Incentives in Organizations," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 115-132, Fall.
  13. Bentley W. MacLeod, 2003. "Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 216-240, March.
  14. Wallace E. Huffman, 1974. "Decision Making: The Role of Education," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 56(1), pages 85-97.
  15. Wallace E. Huffman & Richard E. Just, 2000. "Setting Efficient Incentives for Agricultural Research: Lessons from Principal-Agent Theory," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 82(4), pages 828-841.
  16. Canice Prendergast, 2002. "The Tenuous Trade-off between Risk and Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(5), pages 1071-1102, October.
  17. Thomas, Jonathan & Worrall, Tim, 1990. "Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 367-390, August.
  18. Mas-Colell, Andreu & Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., 1995. "Microeconomic Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195102680.
  19. Gary S. Becker, 1994. "Investment in Human Capital: Effects on Earnings," NBER Chapters,in: Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis with Special Reference to Education (3rd Edition), pages 29-58 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  20. D. Gale Johnson, 1950. "Resource Allocation under Share Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58, pages 111-111.
  21. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Mohamed Salah Matoussi, 1995. "Moral Hazard, Financial Constraints and Sharecropping in El Oulja," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 62(3), pages 381-399.
  22. Bengt Holmstrom, 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring.
  23. Gershon Feder & Richard E. Just & Andrew Schmitz, 1980. "Futures Markets and the Theory of the Firm under Price Uncertainty," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 94(2), pages 317-328.
  24. Danthine, Jean-Pierre, 1978. "Information, futures prices, and stabilizing speculation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 79-98, February.
  25. Alston, Lee J. & Higgs, Robert, 1982. "Contractual Mix in Southern Agriculture since the Civil War: Facts, Hypotheses, and Tests," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(02), pages 327-353, June.
  26. Allen, Douglas & Lueck, Dean, 1992. "Contract Choice in Modern Agriculture: Cash Rent versus Cropshare," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(2), pages 397-426, October.
  27. Abhijit V. Banerjee & Paul J. Gertler & Maitreesh Ghatak, 2002. "Empowerment and Efficiency: Tenancy Reform in West Bengal," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(2), pages 239-280, April.
  28. H. Peyton Young & Mary A. Burke, 2001. "Competition and Custom in Economic Contracts: A Case Study of Illinois Agriculture," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 559-573, June.
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