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Prudential Discipline for Financial Firms: Micro, Macro, and Market Structures

  • Larry D. Wall

The recent global financial crisis reflects numerous breakdowns in the prudential discipline of financial firms. This paper discusses ways to strengthen micro- and macroprudential supervision and restore credible market discipline. The discussion notes that microprudential supervisors are typically assigned a variety of goals that sometimes have conflicting policy implications. In such a setting, the structure of the regulatory agencies and the priority given to prudential goals are critical to achieving those goals. [ADBI Working Paper 176]

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Paper provided by eSocialSciences in its series Working Papers with number id:3040.

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Date of creation: Oct 2010
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Handle: RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:3040
Note: Institutional Papers
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  1. Larry D. Wall & Robert A. Eisenbeis, 1999. "Financial regulatory structure and the resolution of conflicting goals," Working Paper 99-12, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
  2. Gillian G.H. Garcia & Rosa M. Lastra & María J. Nieto, 2009. "Bankruptcy and reorganization procedures for cross-border banks in the EU: Towards an integrated approach to the reform of the EU safety net," Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 17(3), pages 240-276, July.
  3. Hart, Oliver & Zingales, Luigi, 2009. "A New Capital Regulation For Large Financial Institutions," CEPR Discussion Papers 7298, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Kristopher S. Gerardi & Andreas Lehnert & Shane M. Sherlund & Paul S. Willen, 2009. "Making sense of the subprime crisis," Public Policy Discussion Paper 09-1, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
  5. Adam B. Ashcraft & Morten L. Bech & W. Scott Frame, 2008. "The Federal Home Loan Bank System: the lender of next-to-last resort?," Staff Reports 357, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  6. Larry D. Wall, 1986. "Nonbank activities and risk," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, issue Oct, pages 19-34.
  7. Gillian G.H. Garcia, 2009. "Ignoring the lessons for effective prudential supervision, failed bank resolution and depositor protection," Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 17(3), pages 186-209, July.
  8. David G. Mayes & María J. Nieto & Larry Wall, 2008. "Multiple safety net regulators and agency problems in the EU: Is Prompt Corrective Action partly the solution?," Banco de Espa�a Working Papers 0819, Banco de Espa�a.
  9. Rajan, Raghuram G., 2013. "The Credit Crisis and Cycle-Proof Regulation," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Nov, pages 461-467.
  10. Kenneth Lehn, 1999. "Comments on “Financial Regulatory Structure and the Resolution of Conflicting Goals”," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 247-248, December.
  11. Carlos O. Arteta & Mark S. Carey & Ricardo Correa & Jason Kotter, 2008. "Which banks sponsored ABCP vehicles and why?," Proceedings 1072, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  12. Kane, Edward J, 1977. "Good Intentions and Unintended Evil: The Case against Selective Credit Allocation," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 9(1), pages 55-69, February.
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