Bankruptcy and reorganization procedures for cross-border banks in the EU: Towards an integrated approach to the reform of the EU safety net
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the complexities of reorganizing and/or liquidating troubled banks under the European Union's (EU) current institutional framework as it is defined by its directives and by national supervisory, remedial, and insolvency practices. Design/methodology/approach – The paper compares provisions of different EU directives that impact financial institutions and summarizes national remedial practices. Findings – The paper documents the diversity that currently exists among national supervisory, remedial and failure resolution practices for banks. It also assesses the economic efficiency of the institutional framework for resolving problem banks that is defined by the Reorganization and Winding-up Directive and identifies components of the directive that can hamper efficient cross-border resolutions. Research limitations/implications – There is a deficiency in publicly available information on EU member countries' practices for disciplining and resolving troubled banks. Practical implications – The paper assesses issues/conditions that can hamper efficient cross-border resolutions – issues on which policymakers should focus when they reform the current framework. It also explores areas of coordination with other EU directives that deal with financial crisis management that are relevant in the current financial crisis. Originality/value – The paper makes policy recommendations for reforming the EU's current institutional framework for resolving troubled banks.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 17 (2009)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.emeraldinsight.com|
|Order Information:|| Postal: Emerald Group Publishing, Howard House, Wagon Lane, Bingley, BD16 1WA, UK|
Web: http://emeraldgrouppublishing.com/products/journals/journals.htm?id=jfrc Email:
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- George G. Kaufman, 2004. "FDIC losses in bank failures: has FDICIA made a difference?," Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue Q III, pages 13-25.
- Gillian G. H. Garcia & Maria J. Nieto, 2007. "Preserving Financial Stability: A Dilemma For The European Union," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 25(3), pages 444-458, 07.
- MarÃa Nieto & Garry J. Schinasi, 2007.
"EU Framework for Safeguarding Financial Stability; Towards an Analytical Benchmark for Assessing its Effectiveness,"
IMF Working Papers
07/260, International Monetary Fund.
- María J. Nieto & Garry J. Schinasi, 2008. "EU framework for safeguarding financial stability: Towards an analytical benchmark for assessing its effectiveness," Occasional Papers 0801, Banco de España;Occasional Papers Homepage.
- Rosa Maria Lastra, 2003. "Cross-Border Bank Insolvency: Legal Implications in the Case of Banks Operating in Different Jurisdictions in Latin America," Journal of International Economic Law, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(1), pages 79-110, March.
- David G. Mayes & María J. Nieto & Larry Wall, 2008.
"Multiple safety net regulators and agency problems in the EU: Is Prompt Corrective Action partly the solution?,"
0819, Banco de España;Working Papers Homepage.
- Mayes, David G. & Nieto, María J. & Wall, Larry, 2008. "Multiple safety net regulators and agency problems in the EU: Is Prompt Corrective Action partly the solution?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 232-257, September.
- Robert A. Eisenbeis & Larry D. Wall, 2002. "The major supervisory initiatives post-FDICIA: Are they based on the goals of PCA? Should they be?," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2002-31, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
- María J. Nieto & Larry D. Wall, 2007.
"Preconditions for a successful implementation of supervisors' Prompt Corrective Action: Is there a case for a banking standard in the EU?,"
0702, Banco de España;Working Papers Homepage.
- Larry Wall & Maria Nieto, 2006. "Precondition for a Successful Implementation of Supervisors' Primpt Corrective Action: Is There a Case for a Banking Standard in the EU?," FMG Special Papers sp165, Financial Markets Group.
- Barth,James R. & Caprio,Gerard & Levine,Ross, 2006.
"Rethinking Bank Regulation,"
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521855761, June.
- International Monetary Fund, 2008. "Cross-Border Coordination of Prudential Supervision and Deposit Guarantees," IMF Working Papers 08/283, International Monetary Fund.
- George G. Kaufman, 2004. "Depositor Liquidity and Loss Sharing in Bank Failure Resolutions," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 22(2), pages 237-249, 04.
- Lastra, Rosa Maria, 2006. "Legal Foundations of International Monetary Stability," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199269341, June.
- El-Agraa,Ali (ed.), 2007. "The European Union," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521874434, June.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eme:jfrcpp:v:17:y:2009:i:3:p:240-276. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Louise Lister)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.