When the past is present – The ratchet effect in the local commons
The indirect evolutionary approach integrates forward-looking evaluation of opportunities and adaptation in the light of the past. Subjective motivation determines behavior, but long-run evolutionary success of motivational types depends on objective factors only, what can justify intrinsic aversion to inequality in reward allocation games. Whereas earlier analysis has typically been restricted to a particular game, we consider a more complex environment by combining different games which – studied in isolation – yield opposite implications for the survival of inequality aversion. Persistent divergence between intrinsic motivation and true material success is possible depending on the type of inequality aversion considered as well as on agents’ ability to discriminate between the different games they face.
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