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When the past is present – The ratchet effect in the local commons

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  • Gerlinde Fellner
  • Magdalena Margreiter
  • Nuria Oses Eraso

Abstract

The indirect evolutionary approach integrates forward-looking evaluation of opportunities and adaptation in the light of the past. Subjective motivation determines behavior, but long-run evolutionary success of motivational types depends on objective factors only, what can justify intrinsic aversion to inequality in reward allocation games. Whereas earlier analysis has typically been restricted to a particular game, we consider a more complex environment by combining different games which – studied in isolation – yield opposite implications for the survival of inequality aversion. Persistent divergence between intrinsic motivation and true material success is possible depending on the type of inequality aversion considered as well as on agents’ ability to discriminate between the different games they face.

Suggested Citation

  • Gerlinde Fellner & Magdalena Margreiter & Nuria Oses Eraso, 2003. "When the past is present – The ratchet effect in the local commons," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2003-23, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
  • Handle: RePEc:esi:discus:2003-23
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public Goods; Social Dilemma; Experimental Economics; Ratchet Effect; Local Interaction;

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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