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Free riding on altruism and group size

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  • HINDRIKS , Jean
  • PANCS, Romans

Abstract

It is shown that altruism does not affect the equilibrium provision of public goods although altruism takes the form of unconditional commitment to contribute. The reason is that altruistic contributions completely crowd out selfish voluntary contributions. That is, egoists free ride on altruism. It is also shown that public goods are less likely to be provided in larger groups. The only qualification to our results is when the probability of altruism is so high that it is a dominant strategy for all egoistic players to free ride. In this case, actually, both altruism and the larger group facilitate public good provision.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • HINDRIKS , Jean & PANCS, Romans, 2002. "Free riding on altruism and group size," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1560, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:1560
    DOI: 10.1111/1467-9779.00101
    Note: In : Journal of Public Economic Theory, 4(3), 335-346, 2002
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    Cited by:

    1. Moore, Alexander K. & Lewis, Joshua & Levine, Emma E. & Schweitzer, Maurice E., 2023. "Benevolent friends and high integrity leaders: How preferences for benevolence and integrity change across relationships," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 177(C).
    2. Nöldeke, Georg & Peña, Jorge, 2020. "Group size and collective action in a binary contribution game," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 42-51.
    3. Cohen-Vernik, Dinah & Pazgal, Amit & Syam, Niladri B., 2019. "Competing with co-created products," International Journal of Research in Marketing, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 63-82.
    4. Jayson Lusk & Tomas Nilsson & Ken Foster, 2007. "Public Preferences and Private Choices: Effect of Altruism and Free Riding on Demand for Environmentally Certified Pork," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 36(4), pages 499-521, April.
    5. Gerlinde Fellner & Magdalena Margreiter & Nuria Oses Eraso, 2003. "When the past is present – The ratchet effect in the local commons," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2003-23, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
    6. Rainer Bartel, 2007. "Der öffentliche Sektor in der Defensive," Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft - WuG, Kammer für Arbeiter und Angestellte für Wien, Abteilung Wirtschaftswissenschaft und Statistik, vol. 33(2), pages 199-230.
    7. Niladri B. Syam & Amit Pazgal, 2013. "Co-Creation with Production Externalities," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 32(5), pages 805-820, September.
    8. Ujiie, Kiyokazu, 2011. "The Effect of Altruism on Consumer Behavior in Japan: an Analysis on Rice Consumption using Scanner Data," 2011 International Congress, August 30-September 2, 2011, Zurich, Switzerland 116094, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    9. Schippers, Anouk L. & Soetevent, Adriaan R., 2022. "Sharing with Minimal Regulation? Free Riding and Neighborhood Book Exchange," EconStor Preprints 249448, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    10. Makris, Miltiadis, 2009. "Private provision of discrete public goods," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 292-299, September.
    11. Gerard Domènech-Gironell & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2025. "Buying elections for peanuts," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 80(2), pages 565-593, September.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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