Signaling Quality with Initially Reduced Royalty Rates
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|Date of creation:||Dec 2013|
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- Balkenborg, Dieter & Makris, Miltiadis, 2015. "An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 918-958.
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- Mezzetti, Claudio & Tsoulouhas, Theofanis, 2000. "Gathering information before signing a contract with a privately informed principal," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 667-689, May.
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- Leon Yang Chu & David E.M. Sappington, 2009. "Implementing high-powered contracts to motivate intertemporal effort supply," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(2), pages 296-316.
- Beaudry, Paul, 1994. "Why an Informed Principal May Leave Rents to an Agent," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 35(4), pages 821-832, November.
- Martimort, D. & Poudou, J.-C. & Sand-Zantman, W., 2006.
"Contracting for an Innovation under Bilateral Asymmetric Information,"
Cahiers du LASER (LASER Working Papers)
2006.19, LASER (Laboratoire de Science Economique de Richter), Faculty of Economics, University of Montpellier 1.
- Martimort, David & Poudou, Jean-Christophe & Sand-Zantman, Wilfried, 2009. "Contracting for an Innovation under Bilateral Asymmetric Information," IDEI Working Papers 448, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- David Martimort & Jean-Christophe Poudou & Wilfried Sand-Zantman, 2010. "Contracting for an Innovation under Bilateral Asymmetric Information," Post-Print halshs-00754443, HAL.
- Martimort, David & Poudou, Jean-Christophe & Sand-Zantman, Wilfried, 2009. "Contracting for an Innovation under Bilateral Asymmetric Information," TSE Working Papers 09-058, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Blair,Roger D. & Lafontaine,Francine, 2011. "The Economics of Franchising," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521775892, November.
- Chade, Hector & Silvers, Randy, 2002.
"Informed principal, moral hazard, and the value of a more informative technology,"
Elsevier, vol. 74(3), pages 291-300, February.
- Hector Chade & Randolph Silvers, "undated". "Informed Principal, Moral Hazard, and the Value of a More Informative Technology," Working Papers 2133302, Department of Economics, W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University.
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