Responsible corporate governance: Towards a stakeholder board of directors?
The central question posed in this paper will be how to organize board composition in order to ensure responsible corporate governance both from a CSR and a good governance perspective. Adopting a stakeholder approach to corporate governance, we analyze the arguments given by different theoretical approaches for linking specific board composition with financial performance and CSR, and discuss the empirical research conducted. Despite the inconclusive findings of empirical research, it can be argued that diverse stakeholders on the board will promote CSR activities of the firm, but at the same time will increase board capital (which ultimately may lead to a better financial performance). Finally, we propose a model for selecting board members based both on ethical and pragmatic arguments.
|Date of creation:||07 Jul 2007|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: IESE Business School, Av Pearson 21, 08034 Barcelona, SPAIN|
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