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Executive Compensation in Socially Responsible Firms

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  • Melissa B. Frye
  • Edward Nelling
  • Elizabeth Webb

Abstract

This study examines chief executive officer (CEO) compensation and turnover in socially responsible (SR) firms. We compare characteristics of SR firms with a matched sample of firms based on industry and size. Analysis of CEO compensation indicates that the link between CEO pay and firm performance is weaker for SR firms than for non‐SR firms. CEO turnover tests indicate that SR firms are more likely to experience CEO turnover following poor performance. Stock option grants to CEOs of SR firms do not appear to result in future risk‐taking behaviour, whereas such grants are significantly related to future risk at non‐SR firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Melissa B. Frye & Edward Nelling & Elizabeth Webb, 2006. "Executive Compensation in Socially Responsible Firms," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(5), pages 446-455, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:corgov:v:14:y:2006:i:5:p:446-455
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8683.2006.00517.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Boubaker, Sabri & Chebbi, Kaouther & Grira, Jocelyn, 2020. "Top management inside debt and corporate social responsibility? Evidence from the US," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 98-115.
    2. Sajid Ullah & Farman Ullah Khan & Laura-Mariana Cismaș & Muhammad Usman & Andra Miculescu, 2022. "Do Tournament Incentives Matter for CEOs to Be Environmentally Responsible? Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 19(1), pages 1-20, January.
    3. Forest L. Reinhardt & Robert N. Stavins & Richard H. K. Vietor, 2008. "Corporate Social Responsibility Through an Economic Lens," Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 2(2), pages 219-239, Summer.
    4. Michael KOPEL & Marco A. MARINI, 2016. "Organization And Governance In Social Economy Enterprises: An Introduction," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 87(3), pages 309-313, December.
    5. Julija Winschel & Martin Stawinoga, 2019. "Determinants and effects of sustainable CEO compensation: a structured literature review of empirical evidence," Management Review Quarterly, Springer, vol. 69(3), pages 265-328, September.
    6. Gratiela Georgiana Noja & Mirela Cristea & Cecilia Nicoleta Jurcut & Alexandru Buglea & Ion Lala Popa, 2020. "Management Financial Incentives and Firm Performance in a Sustainable Development Framework: Empirical Evidence from European Companies," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(18), pages 1-22, September.
    7. Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné & Sandrine Spaeter, 2016. "Incentive Contracts and Downside Risk Sharing," Working Papers of BETA 2016-22, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    8. Habiba Al-Shaer & Mahbub Zaman, 2019. "CEO Compensation and Sustainability Reporting Assurance: Evidence from the UK," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 158(1), pages 233-252, August.
    9. Habib Jouber, 2019. "How does CEO pay slice influence corporate social responsibility? U.S.–Canadian versus Spanish–French listed firms," Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 26(2), pages 502-517, March.
    10. Michael Kopel & Marco Marini, 2014. "Strategic delegation in consumer cooperatives under mixed oligopoly," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 113(3), pages 275-296, November.
    11. Pierre Chaigneau, 2018. "Managerial Compensation and Firm Value in the Presence of Socially Responsible Investors," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 149(3), pages 747-768, May.
    12. Haque, Faizul, 2017. "The effects of board characteristics and sustainable compensation policy on carbon performance of UK firms," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 347-364.
    13. Novak, Jiri & Bilinski, Pawel, 2018. "Social stigma and executive compensation," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 169-184.
    14. Markus Kitzmueller & Jay Shimshack, 2012. "Economic Perspectives on Corporate Social Responsibility," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 50(1), pages 51-84, March.
    15. Douglas A. Adu & Antoinette Flynn & Colette Grey, 2022. "Executive compensation and sustainable business practices: The moderating role of sustainability‐based compensation," Business Strategy and the Environment, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(3), pages 698-736, March.
    16. Claude Francoeur & Andrea Melis & Silvia Gaia & Simone Aresu, 2017. "Green or Greed? An Alternative Look at CEO Compensation and Corporate Environmental Commitment," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 140(3), pages 439-453, February.
    17. Michele Fabrizi & Christine Mallin & Giovanna Michelon, 2014. "The Role of CEO’s Personal Incentives in Driving Corporate Social Responsibility," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 124(2), pages 311-326, October.
    18. Ayuso, Silvia & Argandoña, Antonio, 2007. "Responsible corporate governance: Towards a stakeholder board of directors?," IESE Research Papers D/701, IESE Business School.
    19. Costa, King & Ngcetane-Vika, Thelela, 2021. "A comparative analysis of strengths and weaknesses of corporate governance practices between two jurisdictions; UK and South Africa," AfricArxiv k4cj3, Center for Open Science.
    20. Eriana Kartadjumena & Waymond Rodgers, 2019. "Executive Compensation, Sustainability, Climate, Environmental Concerns, and Company Financial Performance: Evidence from Indonesian Commercial Banks," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(6), pages 1-21, March.
    21. Kopel, Michael & Brand, Björn, 2012. "Socially responsible firms and endogenous choice of strategic incentives," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 982-989.
    22. Elisa Baraibar‐Diez & María D. Odriozola & José Luis Fernández Sánchez, 2019. "Sustainable compensation policies and its effect on environmental, social, and governance scores," Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 26(6), pages 1457-1472, November.
    23. Kopel, Michael & Putz, Eva Maria, 2021. "Why socially concerned firms use low-powered managerial incentives: A complementary explanation," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 473-482.
    24. Karen Maas & Sanne Rosendaal, 2016. "Sustainability Targets in Executive Remuneration: Targets, Time Frame, Country and Sector Specification," Business Strategy and the Environment, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(6), pages 390-401, September.

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