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Bank capital regulation and credit supply

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  • Hyun, Jung-Soon
  • Rhee, Byung-Kun

Abstract

Banks can meet the need to increase their capital ratio either by issuing new equity or by reducing loans. It is generally known that banks prefer to reduce assets due to the high cost of equity. With a simple banking model we show that, if incumbent shareholders are to benefit, banks may prefer to reduce loans, even though they can recapitalize by issuing new equity without any cost. The result holds when banks hold relatively small amounts of long-term loans, or when the economy is in downturn.

Suggested Citation

  • Hyun, Jung-Soon & Rhee, Byung-Kun, 2011. "Bank capital regulation and credit supply," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 323-330, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:35:y:2011:i:2:p:323-330
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Hakenes, Hendrik & Schnabel, Isabel, 2011. "Bank size and risk-taking under Basel II," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(6), pages 1436-1449, June.
    2. Neyer, Ulrike & Sterzel, André, 2017. "Capital requirements for government bonds: Implications for bank behaviour and financial stability," DICE Discussion Papers 275, University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    3. Fratianni, Michele & Marchionne, Francesco, 2017. "Bank asset reallocation and sovereign debt," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 15-32.
    4. repec:kap:iaecre:v:21:y:2015:i:1:p:33-40 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Brei, Michael & Gambacorta, Leonardo & von Peter, Goetz, 2013. "Rescue packages and bank lending," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 490-505.
    6. Jarko Fidrmuc & Philipp Schreiber & Martin Siddiqui, 2015. "The Transmission of Bank Funding to Corporate Loans: Deleveraging in Germany," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 581-597, July.
    7. Sterzel, André & Neyer, Ulrike, 2017. "Capital Requirements for Government Bonds - Implications for Financial Stability," Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168172, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    8. Mehmed Ganić & BETÜL Ismić & Ognjen Riđić, 2015. "What drives the profitability of the banking sector? An Empirical evidence from Bosnia &Herzegovina," Romanian Economic Journal, Department of International Business and Economics from the Academy of Economic Studies Bucharest, vol. 18(55), pages 39-56, March.
    9. Tsai, Jeng-Yan, 2013. "Optimal bank interest margins under capital regulation in a call-option utility framework," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 557-565.
    10. Yang Li & Yi-Kai Chen & Feng Sheng Chien & Wen Chih Lee & Yi Ching Hsu, 2016. "Study of optimal capital adequacy ratios," Journal of Productivity Analysis, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 261-274, June.
    11. Oana Toader, 2015. "Estimating the impact of higher capital requirements on the cost of equity: an empirical study of European banks," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 411-436, September.
    12. Montgomery, Heather & Takahashi, Yuki, 2014. "The economic consequences of the TARP: The effectiveness of bank recapitalization policies in the U.S," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 49-64.
    13. repec:eee:jbfina:v:82:y:2017:i:c:p:203-216 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Kenji Tsuji, 2015. "Bank Capital Regulation and Soft Budget Constraints," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 21(1), pages 33-40, March.
    15. Mario Mustilli & Francesco Campanella & Eugenio D’Angelo, 2017. "Basel III and Credit Crunch: An Empirical Test with Focus on Europe," Journal of Applied Finance & Banking, SCIENPRESS Ltd, vol. 7(3), pages 1-3.
    16. Laetitia Lepetit & Amine Tarazi & Nadia Zedek, 2012. "Bank Regulatory Capital Adjustment and Ultimate Ownership Structure: Evidence from European Commercial Banks," Working Papers hal-00918577, HAL.
    17. Sergio Mayordomo & María Rodríguez-Moreno, 2017. "Did the bank capital relief induced by the supporting factor enhance SME lending?," Working Papers 1746, Banco de España;Working Papers Homepage.
    18. repec:spr:schmbr:v:18:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s41464-017-0035-x is not listed on IDEAS
    19. Laetitia Lepetit & Amine Tarazi & Nadia Zedek, 2012. "Ultimate Ownership Structure and Bank Regulatory Capital Adjustment: Evidence from European Commercial Banks," Working Papers hal-00918579, HAL.
    20. Tsai, Jeng-Yan, 2012. "Risk and regret aversions on optimal bank interest margin under capital regulation," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 29(6), pages 2190-2197.
    21. Shim, Jeungbo, 2013. "Bank capital buffer and portfolio risk: The influence of business cycle and revenue diversification," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 761-772.
    22. repec:pal:jbkreg:v:18:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1057_s41261-016-0003-2 is not listed on IDEAS

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