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Agency costs, governance, and organizational forms: Evidence from the mutual fund industry

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  • Ferris, Stephen P.
  • Yan, Xuemin (Sterling)

Abstract

Using a comprehensive sample of mutual funds and fund families for the period 1992-2004, this study examines the impact of fund management companies' organizational forms on the level of agency costs within mutual funds. We find that, all else being equal: (1) funds managed by public fund families charge higher fees than those managed by private fund families; (2) public fund families acquire more funds than private fund families; and (3) funds of public fund families significantly underperform funds of private fund families. Collectively, these findings suggest that agency costs are higher in mutual funds managed by public fund families. Our results are consistent with the idea that the agency conflict between the fund management company and fund shareholders is more acute for public management companies because of their shorter-term focus.

Suggested Citation

  • Ferris, Stephen P. & Yan, Xuemin (Sterling), 2009. "Agency costs, governance, and organizational forms: Evidence from the mutual fund industry," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(4), pages 619-626, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:33:y:2009:i:4:p:619-626
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    Cited by:

    1. Eric Fricke, 2015. "Board Holdings, Compensation and Mutual Fund Manager Turnover," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 47(3), pages 295-312, June.
    2. Chen, Hsuan-Chi & Lai, Christine W., 2010. "Reputation stretching in mutual fund starts," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 193-207, January.
    3. Alexander Eisele & Tamara Nefedova & Gianpaolo Parise, 2016. "Are star funds really shining? Cross-trading and performance shifting in mutual fund families," BIS Working Papers 577, Bank for International Settlements.
    4. Adams, John C. & Mansi, Sattar A. & Nishikawa, Takeshi, 2012. "Are mutual fund fees excessive?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(8), pages 2245-2259.
    5. Eric Fricke, 2013. "Board compensation, holdings and mutual fund expense ratios," Managerial Finance, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 39(3), pages 228-250, February.
    6. Cullen, Grant & Gasbarro, Dominic & Monroe, Gary S., 2010. "Mutual fund trades and the value of contradictory private information," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 378-387, February.
    7. repec:eee:quaeco:v:67:y:2018:i:c:p:121-137 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Clemens Sialm & T. Mandy Tham, 2016. "Spillover Effects in Mutual Fund Companies," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(5), pages 1472-1486, May.
    9. Ng, Lilian & Wang, Qinghai & Zaiats, Nataliya, 2009. "Firm performance and mutual fund voting," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(12), pages 2207-2217, December.
    10. Hyun, Jung-Soon & Rhee, Byung-Kun, 2011. "Bank capital regulation and credit supply," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 323-330, February.
    11. Alexander Eisele & Tamara Nefedova & Gianpaolo Parise, 2015. "Are Star Funds Really Shining? Cross-trading And Performance Shifting In Mutual Fund Families," Post-Print hal-01458357, HAL.
    12. Bryant, Lonnie L. & Liu, Hao-Chen, 2011. "Mutual fund industry management structure, risk and the impacts to shareholders," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 101-115.
    13. Boldin, Michael & Cici, Gjergji, 2010. "The index fund rationality paradox," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 33-43, January.
    14. repec:eee:jiaata:v:22:y:2013:i:2:p:86-97 is not listed on IDEAS

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