How do entrenched managers handle stakeholders interests?
This study examines the impact of managerial entrenchment on non-shareholding stakeholders. We find that managers tend to focus different levels of attention on specific non-shareholding stakeholders relative to their level of entrenchment. When managers have greater protection, they tend to establish good relationships with certain stakeholders, particularly with regard to the natural environment. However, well-protected managers attempt to minimize any damage to workforce diversity and often increase the damage to the employees and the natural environment. Entrenched managers pay more attention to stakeholders who can have a positive influence on the short-term financial performance of the firm. However, negative social actions have insignificant effect on financial performance.
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Volume (Year): 22 (2012)
Issue (Month): 5 ()
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