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Do corporate governance characteristics influence tax management?

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  • Minnick, Kristina
  • Noga, Tracy

Abstract

This paper investigates how corporate governance plays a role in long-run tax management and contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, we add insight into the horizon problems related to executive and director compensation and show that incentive compensation provides long-term incentives to improve performance by establishing a link between higher pay-performance sensitivity and lower taxes. Second, this is one of the first papers, to our knowledge, to empirically examine the role of governance in corporate tax management from a long-term perspective in order to better understand the lasting effects of governance. We find that incentive compensation drives managers to make investments into longer-horizon pay outs such as tax management. Furthermore, we find that this investment into tax management benefits shareholders; better tax management is positively related to higher returns to shareholders. We also address the endogeneity issues of corporate governance and performance measures. Finally, our paper is unique in examining which type of tax management strategy (domestic or foreign) different firms focus on. Our results shed light into how governance can improve firm performance and increase shareholder value in the long run.

Suggested Citation

  • Minnick, Kristina & Noga, Tracy, 2010. "Do corporate governance characteristics influence tax management?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 16(5), pages 703-718, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:16:y:2010:i:5:p:703-718
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    Cited by:

    1. Hsiang-Lan Chen & Chiao-Yi Chang & Wen-Tsung Hsu, 2017. "Does Board Co-Working Experience Influence Directors’ Decisions Toward Internationalization?," Management International Review, Springer, vol. 57(1), pages 65-92, February.
    2. Ana Isabel Martins Ribeiro & António Cerqueira & Elísio Brandão, 2015. "The Determinants of Effective Tax Rates: Firms’ Characteristics and Corporate Governance," FEP Working Papers 567, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.
    3. Huseynov, Fariz & Sardarli, Sabuhi & Zhang, Wei, 2017. "Does index addition affect corporate tax avoidance?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, pages 241-259.
    4. Kubick, Thomas R. & Lockhart, G. Brandon, 2016. "Do external labor market incentives motivate CEOs to adopt more aggressive corporate tax reporting preferences?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, pages 255-277.
    5. Steijvers, Tensie & Niskanen, Mervi, 2014. "Tax aggressiveness in private family firms: An agency perspective," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, pages 347-357.
    6. Ahmed Boussaidi & Mounira Sidhom Hamed, 2015. "The impact of governance mechanisms on tax aggressiveness: Empirical evidence from Tunisian context," Journal of Asian Business Strategy, Asian Economic and Social Society, pages 1-12.
    7. DeBacker, Jason & Heim, Bradley T. & Tran, Anh, 2015. "Importing corruption culture from overseas: Evidence from corporate tax evasion in the United States," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 122-138.
    8. repec:eee:corfin:v:44:y:2017:i:c:p:233-254 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Anna Alon & Amy Hageman, 2013. "The Impact of Corruption on Firm Tax Compliance in Transition Economies: Whom Do You Trust?," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, pages 479-494.
    10. Armstrong, Christopher S. & Blouin, Jennifer L. & Jagolinzer, Alan D. & Larcker, David F., 2015. "Corporate governance, incentives, and tax avoidance," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, pages 1-17.
    11. repec:eee:jbrese:v:79:y:2017:i:c:p:161-172 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Juan Monterrey Mayoral & Amparo Sánchez Segura, 2015. "Planificación fiscal y Gobierno Corporativo en las empresas cotizadas españolas," Hacienda Pública Española, IEF, pages 55-89.
    13. K. Hung Chan & Phyllis L. L. Mo & Amy Y. Zhou & Steven Cahan, 2013. "Government ownership, corporate governance and tax aggressiveness: evidence from China," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 53(4), pages 1029-1051, December.
    14. Diogo Batista da SIlva & António Cerqueira & Elísio Brandão, 2017. "Earnings Management Dynamics in Portuguese Listed Firms," FEP Working Papers 587, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.
    15. Huseynov, Fariz & Klamm, Bonnie K., 2012. "Tax avoidance, tax management and corporate social responsibility," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, pages 804-827.
    16. Wang, Li-Hsun & Lin, Chu-Hsiung & Fung, Hung-Gay & Chen, Hsien-Ming, 2015. "Governance mechanisms and downside risk," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, pages 485-498.
    17. Armstrong, Christopher S. & Blouin, Jennifer L. & Jagolinzer, Alan D. & Larcker, David F., 2015. "Corporate Governance, Incentives, and Tax Avoidance," Research Papers 2134, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    18. Kiesewetter, Dirk & Manthey, Johannes, 2017. "The relationship between corporate governance and tax avoidance - evidence from Germany using a regression discontinuity design," arqus Discussion Papers in Quantitative Tax Research 218, arqus - Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre.
    19. repec:eee:ecofin:v:42:y:2017:i:c:p:374-392 is not listed on IDEAS
    20. Hill, Matthew D. & Kubick, Thomas R. & Brandon Lockhart, G. & Wan, Huishan, 2013. "The effectiveness and valuation of political tax minimization," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(8), pages 2836-2849.

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    Corporate governance Tax management;

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