EU Patent System: to be or not to be?
This paper introduce a list of desirable efficiency properties that any a patent system should have in order to enhance innovation, trade competitiveness, employment mobility and economic growth. We briefly overview the literature on patents and discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the present and recent proposals for the future of the European Union Patents System. In particular, we discuss the costinefficiencies observed in the current design of the EU Patent System based in a double structure layer divided in a central European Patent Office (EPO) and several nationalbased patent offices. This paper analyzes the likely backlashes of creating a third layer for a sub‐sample of EU countries. The paper suggests an alternative more efficient Patent System together with some policy implications.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Klepper, Steven & Thompson, Peter, 2010. "Disagreements and intra-industry spinoffs," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(5), pages 526-538, September.
- Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie & Didier François, 2009.
"The Cost Factor in Patent Systems,"
Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade,
Springer, vol. 9(4), pages 329-355, December.
- Bruno Van Pottelsberghe & Didier François, 2009. "The cost factor in patent systems," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/13422, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Francois, Didier & van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, Bruno, 2006. "The Cost Factor in Patent Systems," CEPR Discussion Papers 5944, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Bruno Van Pottelsberghe & Didier François, 2006. "The cost factor in patent systems," Working Papers CEB 06-002.RS, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Marco Giarratana & Salvatore Torrisi, 2001. "Competence Accumulation and Collaborative Ventures Evidence from the Largest European Electronics Firms and Implications for the EU Technological Policies," DRUID Working Papers 01-02, DRUID, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy/Aalborg University, Department of Business Studies.
- Philippe Aghion & Nick Bloom & Richard Blundell & Rachel Griffith & Peter Howitt, 2005.
"Competition and Innovation: an Inverted-U Relationship,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 120(2), pages 701-728.
- Philippe Aghion & Nicholas Bloom & Richard Blundell & Rachel Griffith & Peter Howitt, 2002. "Competition and Innovation: An Inverted U Relationship," NBER Working Papers 9269, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Philippe Aghion & Nicholas Bloom & Richard Blundell & Rachel Griffith & Peter Howitt, 2002. "Competition and innovation: an inverted U relationship," IFS Working Papers W02/04, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Howitt, Peter & Griffith, Rachel & Aghion, Philippe & Blundell, Richard & Bloom, Nick, 2005. "Competition and Innovation: An Inverted-U Relationship," Scholarly Articles 4481507, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Ashish Arora & Robert P. Merges, 2004. "Specialized supply firms, property rights and firm boundaries," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(3), pages 451-475, June.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cte:werepe:we1101. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ana Poveda)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.