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Capacity Choices in Liberalized Electricity Markets

Author

Listed:
  • Castro-Rodriguez, Fidel
  • Marín Uribe, Pedro Luis
  • Siotis, Georges

Abstract

We develop a theoretical model of long-run investment decisions on capacity in the context of a liberalized electricity market. The sector's idiosyncrasies such as the uncertainty surrounding future supply and demand, as well as technological constraints, are explicitly modelled. The model is sufficiently flexible to describe the situation in different systems. We derive the level of capacity that maximizes social welfare, and compare it to a decentralized outcome. We show that in the absence of any regulation, private investment decisions on capacity unambiguously lead to a socially sub-optimal outcome, and we illustrate these results using simulations.

Suggested Citation

  • Castro-Rodriguez, Fidel & Marín Uribe, Pedro Luis & Siotis, Georges, 2001. "Capacity Choices in Liberalized Electricity Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 2998, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2998
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jean J. Gabszewicz & Sougata Poddar, 1997. "Demand fluctuations and capacity utilization under duopoly," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 10(1), pages 131-146.
    2. Veronika Grimm & Gregor Zoettl, 2006. "Capacity Choice under Uncertainty: The Impact of Market Structure," Working Paper Series in Economics 23, University of Cologne, Department of Economics.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Lachman, Daniël A., 2011. "Leapfrog to the future: Energy scenarios and strategies for Suriname to 2050," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(9), pages 5035-5044, September.
    2. John FitzGerald, 2002. "The Irish Energy Market - Putting the Customer First," Papers WP145, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI).
    3. Boom, Anette & Buehler, Stefan, 2014. "Restructuring the Electricity Industry: Vertical Structure and the Risk of Rent Extraction," Working Papers 02-2014, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics.
    4. Moreno, Fermín & Martínez-Val, José M., 2011. "Collateral effects of renewable energies deployment in Spain: Impact on thermal power plants performance and management," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(10), pages 6561-6574, October.
    5. Sherzod Tashpulatov & Lubomir Lizal, 2012. "Can Producers Apply a Capacity Cutting Strategy to Increase Prices? The Case of the England and Wales Electricity Market," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp465, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    6. Anette Boom & Stefan Buehler, 2007. "Restructuring Electricity Markets when Demand is Uncertain: Effects on Capacity Investments, Prices and Welfare," CIE Discussion Papers 2007-09, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
    7. Aitor Ciarreta & María Espinosa, 2010. "Market power in the Spanish electricity auction," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 42-69, February.
    8. Aitor Ciarreta & María Paz Espinosa, 2006. "Demand Elasticity and Market Power in the Spanish Electricity Market," Working Papers 0606, Departament Empresa, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, revised Jun 2006.
    9. Steven Brakman & Charles van Marrewijk & Arjen van Witteloostuijn, 2009. "Market Liberalization in the European Natural Gas Market - The Importance of Capacity Constraints and Efficiency Differences," CESifo Working Paper Series 2697, CESifo Group Munich.
    10. Lízal, Lubomír M. & Tashpulatov, Sherzod N., 2014. "Do producers apply a capacity cutting strategy to increase prices? The case of the England and Wales electricity market," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 114-124.
    11. Perez, Eloy, 2007. "A model of vertical integration and investment in generation capacity in electricity markets: The case of the bidding game," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 41(4), pages 272-290, December.
    12. Anette Boom, "undated". "Investments in Electricity Generation Capacity under Different Market Structures with Price Responsive Demand," Papers 016, Departmental Working Papers.
    13. Boom, Anette, 2009. "Vertically integrated firms' investments in electricity generating capacities," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 544-551, July.
    14. Foster, John & Wagner, Liam & Liebman, Ariel, 2015. "Modelling the Electricity and Natural Gas Sectors for the Future Grid: Developing Co-Optimisation Platforms for Market Redesign," MPRA Paper 70114, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. Serra, Pablo, 2013. "Contract market power and its impact on the efficiency of the electricity sector," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 653-662.
    16. Arellano, Maria-Soledad & Serra, Pablo, 2007. "A model of market power in electricity industries subject to peak load pricing," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(10), pages 5130-5135, October.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    capacity; electricity; liberalization; long-run investment; regulation;

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities

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