Access to Commitment Devices Reduces Investment Incentives in Oligopoly
In this paper we analyze incentives to invest in capacity prior to a sequence of Cournot spot markets with varying demand. We compare equilibrium investment in the absence and in presence of the possibility to trade on forward markets. We find that the access to strategic devices (such as forward contracts as analyzed by Allaz and Vila (1993), or, equivalently strategic delegation as analyzed by Fershtman and Judd (1987) or Vickers (1985)) prior to spot market competition reduces equilibrium investments.
|Date of creation:||06 Jun 2006|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Albertus Magnus Platz, 50923 Köln|
Phone: 0221 / 470 5607
Fax: 0221 / 470 5179
Web page: http://www.wiso.uni-koeln.de
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- GABSZEWICZ, Jean J. & PODDAR , Sougata, 1995.
"Demand Fluctuations and Capacity Utilization under Duopoly,"
CORE Discussion Papers
1995051, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Jean J. Gabszewicz & Sougata Poddar, 1997. "Demand fluctuations and capacity utilization under duopoly," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 10(1), pages 131-146.
- Gabszewicz, J.J. & Poddar, S., "undated". "Demand fluctuations and capacity utilization under duopoly," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1269, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Peter Cramton & Steven Stoft, 2005.
"A Capacity Market that Makes Sense,"
Papers of Peter Cramton
05licap, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2005.
- Bushnell, James, 2005. "Electricity Resource Adequacy: Matching Policies and Goals," The Electricity Journal, Elsevier, vol. 18(8), pages 11-21, October.
- David M. Newbery, 1998.
"Competition, Contracts, and Entry in the Electricity Spot Market,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(4), pages 726-749, Winter.
- Newbery, D. M., 1997. "Competition, Contracts and Entry in the Electricity Spot Market," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 9707, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Mahenc, P. & Salanie, F., 2004. "Softening competition through forward trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 116(2), pages 282-293, June.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kls:series:0025. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christoph Feldhaus)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.