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Are risk-based capital requirements detrimental to corporate lending? Evidence from Europe

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  • Bruno, Brunella
  • Nocera, Giacomo
  • Resti, Andrea

Abstract

In this paper, we first explore the main drivers of the differences in RWAs across European banks. We also assess the impact of RWA-based capital regulation on bank’s asset allocation in 2008-2014. We find that risk weights are affected by bank size, business models, and asset mix. We also find that the adoption of internal ratings-based approaches is an important driver of bank risk-weighted assets and that national segmentations explain a significant (albeit decreasing) share of the variability in risk weights. As for the impact on internal rating on banks’ asset allocation, we uncover that banks using IRB approaches more extensively have reduced more (or increased less) their corporate loan portfolio. Such effect is somehow stronger for banks located in Euro periphery countries during the 2010-12 sovereign crisis. We do not find evidence, however, of a reallocation from corporate loans to government exposures, pointing to the fact that other motives prevail in explaining the banks’ shift towards government bonds during the Euro sovereign crisis, including the “financial repression†channel. ∗

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  • Bruno, Brunella & Nocera, Giacomo & Resti, Andrea, 2017. "Are risk-based capital requirements detrimental to corporate lending? Evidence from Europe," CEPR Discussion Papers 12007, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12007
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    Cited by:

    1. Cucinelli, Doriana & Battista, Maria Luisa Di & Marchese, Malvina & Nieri, Laura, 2018. "Credit risk in European banks: The bright side of the internal ratings based approach," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 213-229.
    2. Sophia Döme & Stefan Kerbl, 2017. "Comparability of Basel risk weights in the EU banking sector," Financial Stability Report, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank), issue 34, pages 68-89.
    3. Brunella Bruno & Alexandra D’Onofrio & Immacolata Marino, 2017. "Determinants of Bank Lending in Europe and the US. Evidence from Crisis and Post Crisis Years," CSEF Working Papers 462, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    4. Marino, Immacolata & D'Onofrio, Alexandra & Bruno, Brunella, 2017. "Determinants of bank lending in Europe and the United States: Evidence from crisis and post-crisis years," CEPR Discussion Papers 12002, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Giovanna Paladino & Zeno Rotondi, 2020. "Banking business models and risk: Findings from the ECB's comprehensive assessment," Economic Notes, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA, vol. 49(2), July.
    6. Raffaele Gallo, 2021. "The IRB approach and bank lending to firms," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 1347, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.

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