Risk-Based Capital Standards and the Credit Crunch
The failure of the banking system to play its normal role in the transmission of the monetary stimulus to the economy may have contributed to the 1990-91 recession and the sluggish recovery from it. This paper examines the 1988 Basel Agreement on risk-based capital standards as a possible shock to the credit supply system and finds that banks with larger capital surpluses resulting from the risk-based requirements had faster loan growth between 1987 and 1991 than those with smaller surpluses or which failed the new standards. Newly issued capital in banks with larger capital surpluses was associated with greater loan growth than were the same capital additions in banks with smaller capital surpluses. Copyright 1995 by Ohio State University Press.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 27 (1995)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0022-2879|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mcb:jmoncb:v:27:y:1995:i:3:p:848-63. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.