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Transaction Costs, the Opportunity Cost of Time and Inertia in Charitable Giving

We conduct a laboratory experiment to analyze the effect transactions costs and inertia have on charitable giving. We conjecture that transaction costs will have a greater effect on donations if the solicitation is received when the opportunity cost of time is high. Inertia could become a factor if people intend to give, but postpone making the payment until they have more time, and having postponed making the donation once, keep doing so. We find evidence of a transaction cost effect, with the size of this effect depending on the opportunity cost of time, but no statistically significant inertia effect.

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File URL: http://www.econ.canterbury.ac.nz/RePEc/cbt/econwp/1405.pdf
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Paper provided by University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance in its series Working Papers in Economics with number 14/05.

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Length: 44 pages
Date of creation: 01 Jan 2014
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cbt:econwp:14/05
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