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Investigating New Types of 'Decoupling': Minority Shareholder Protection in the Law & Corporate Practice

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Listed:
  • Gerhard Schnyder
  • Centre for Business Research

Abstract

The study of decoupling – i.e. the discrepancies between formal policies and actual practices and outcomes – has seen a remarkable revival. Importantly, a distinction between policy-practice and means-ends decoupling has become widely-used. We argue that the decoupling literature still neglects a key feature of decoupling, namely that it is inherently a multi-level concept. Distinguishing explicitly the macro- (country) and the micro- (organisation) levels, we develop a more fine-grained typology of policy–practice and means–ends decoupling. We hypothesise that differences in the macro-environment may influence the type and extent of decoupling that prevails in a given country. We test our hypotheses in the context of the adoption of legal minority shareholder protection in four European countries. We go beyond previous studies that have investigated policy–practice and means-end decoupling in the same context by using a unique dataset for firm-level corporate governance practices that allows us to investigate the multi-level nature of decoupling more directly. Our findings suggest that that decoupling is context specific and the extent to which policy-practice decoupling occurs may depend on a country's legal style.

Suggested Citation

  • Gerhard Schnyder & Centre for Business Research, 2018. "Investigating New Types of 'Decoupling': Minority Shareholder Protection in the Law & Corporate Practice," Working Papers wp502, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
  • Handle: RePEc:cbr:cbrwps:wp502
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Decoupling; Corporate Governance; Minority Shareholder Protection;

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
    • O16 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance

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