Corporate Governance, Corporate and Employment Law, and the Costs of Expropriation
We set up a model to study how ownership structure, corporate law and employment law interact to set the incentives that influence the decision by the large shareholder or manager effectively controlling the firm to divert resources from minority shareholders and employees. We suggest that agency problems between the controller and other investors and holdup problems between shareholders and employees are connected if the controller bears private costs of “expropriating” these groups. Corporate law and employment law may therefore somethimes be substitutes; employees may benefit from better corporate law intended to protect minority shareholder, and viceversa. Our model has implications for the domestic and comparative study of corporate governance structure and addresses, among other things, the question whether large shareholders are better able to “bond” with employees than dispersed ones, or whether the separation of ownership facilitates longterm relationships with labor.
|Date of creation:||Mar 2011|
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Belloc, Marianna & Pagano, Ugo, 2009. "Co-evolution of politics and corporate governance," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 106-114, June.
- Gokhale, Jagadeesh & Groshen, Erica L & Neumark, David, 1995.
"Do Hostile Takeovers Reduce Extramarginal Wage Payments?,"
The Review of Economics and Statistics,
MIT Press, vol. 77(3), pages 470-485, August.
- Jagadeesh Gokhale & Erica L. Groshen & David Neumark, 1992. "Do hostile takeovers reduce extramarginal wage payments?," Working Paper 9215, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
- Jagadeesh Gokhale & Erica L. Groshen & David Neumark, 1993. "Do Hostile Takeovers Reduce Extramarginal Wage Payments?," NBER Working Papers 4346, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Fauver, Larry & Fuerst, Michael E., 2006. "Does good corporate governance include employee representation? Evidence from German corporate boards," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(3), pages 673-710, December.
- Michel A. Habib, 1997. "Monitoring, Implicit Contracting, and the Lack of Permanence of Leveraged Buyouts," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 1(2), pages 139-163.
- Lucian Arye Bebchuk & John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, 2002. "The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence and Policy," NBER Working Papers 8974, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)