Allocation Of Prizes In Contests With Participation Constraints
We study all-pay contests with an exogenous minimal effort constraint where a player can participate in a contest only if his effort (output) is equal to or higher than the minimal effort constraint. Contestants are privately informed about a parameter (ability) that affects their cost of effort. The designer decides about the size and the number of prizes. We analyze the optimal prize allocation for the contest designer who wishes to maximize either the total effort or the highest effort. It is shown that if the minimal effort constraint is relatively high, the winner-take-all contest in which the contestant with the highest effort wins the entire prize sum does not maximize the expected total effort nor the expected highest effort. In that case, the random contest in which the entire prize sum is equally allocated to all the participants yields a higher expected total effort as well as a higher expected highest effort than the winner-take-all contest.
|Date of creation:||2010|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.bgu.ac.il/econ
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian L, 1998.
"Caps on Political Lobbying,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 643-51, June.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bgu:wpaper:1008. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Aamer Abu-Qarn)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.