IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/bdr/borrec/1270.html

Debt taxes during crises, a blessing in disguise?

Author

Listed:
  • Julian A. Parra-Polania
  • CarmiÒa O. Vargas

Abstract

Models with an occasionally binding credit constraint have been used to analyze Önancial crises and previous literature has highlighted that the speciÖc form of this constraint is decisive for policymaking conclusions. What are the welfare e§ects of implementing a policy that is appropriate for a speciÖc type of constraint when the economy is actually facing a di§erent one? We provide an answer by analyzing the implementation either of ex ante (or macroprudential) vs. ex post debt taxes in four possible collateral constraint cases (depending on whether creditors assess current or future and total or disposable income of debtors). Our main conclusion is that a debt tax applied only during potentially constrained periods (i.e., ex post) is a more favorable intervention if the policymaker does not know which credit constraint is facing or if it is more likely to be facing a disposable-income constraint (either for current or future income). **** RESUMEN: Para analizar las crisis financieras, se han utilizado modelos con una restricción crediticia ocasionalmente vinculante y la literatura previa ha destacado que la forma específica de esta restricción es decisiva para la formulación de políticas. ¿Cuáles son los efectos en el bienestar de la implementación de una política que es apropiada para un tipo específico de restricción cuando la economía se enfrenta en realidad a otra diferente? Damos una respuesta analizando la implementación de impuestos ex-ante (o macroprudenciales) sobre la deuda frente a impuestos ex post sobre la deuda en cuatro posibles casos de restricción de colateral (dependiendo de si los acreedores evalúan la renta actual o futura y la renta total o disponible de los deudores). Nuestra principal conclusión es que un impuesto sobre la deuda aplicado sólo durante períodos de crisis (es decir, ex post) es una intervención más favorable si el formulador de políticas no saber a qué restricción crediticia se enfrenta o si es más probable que se enfrente a una que depende del ingreso disponible (ya sea para ingresos corrientes o futuros).

Suggested Citation

  • Julian A. Parra-Polania & CarmiÒa O. Vargas, 2024. "Debt taxes during crises, a blessing in disguise?," Borradores de Economia 1270, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
    • Handle: RePEc:bdr:borrec:1270
    DOI: 10.32468/be.1270
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.32468/be.1270
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.32468/be.1270?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mr. Anton Korinek, 2011. "The New Economics of Capital Controls Imposed for Prudential Reasons+L4888," IMF Working Papers 2011/298, International Monetary Fund.
    2. Devereux, Michael B. & Yu, Changhua, 2019. "Evaluating the role of capital controls and monetary policy in emerging market crises," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 189-211.
    3. Benigno, Gianluca & Chen, Huigang & Otrok, Christopher & Rebucci, Alessandro & Young, Eric R., 2016. "Optimal capital controls and real exchange rate policies: A pecuniary externality perspective," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 147-165.
    4. Javier Bianchi, 2011. "Overborrowing and Systemic Externalities in the Business Cycle," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(7), pages 3400-3426, December.
    5. Anton Korinek, 2011. "The New Economics of Prudential Capital Controls: A Research Agenda," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 59(3), pages 523-561, August.
    6. Olivier Jeanne & Anton Korinek, 2020. "Macroprudential Regulation versus mopping up after the crash," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 87(3), pages 1470-1497.
    7. Javier Bianchi & Enrique G. Mendoza, 2018. "Optimal Time-Consistent Macroprudential Policy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(2), pages 588-634.
    8. Carmiña O. Vargas & Julian A. Parra‐Polania, 2021. "Analysis of macro‐prudential and ex post financial crisis interventions: Relevance of the fiscal‐policy setup," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(3), pages 3759-3769, July.
    9. Devereux, Michael B. & Young, Eric R. & Yu, Changhua, 2019. "Capital controls and monetary policy in sudden-stop economies," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 52-74.
    10. Guido Lorenzoni, 2008. "Inefficient Credit Booms," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 75(3), pages 809-833.
    11. Ottonello, Pablo & Perez, Diego J. & Varraso, Paolo, 2022. "Are collateral-constraint models ready for macroprudential policy design?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 139(C).
    12. Enrique G. Mendoza, 2002. "Credit, Prices, and Crashes: Business Cycles with a Sudden Stop," NBER Chapters, in: Preventing Currency Crises in Emerging Markets, pages 335-392, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Jeanne, Olivier & Korinek, Anton, 2019. "Managing credit booms and busts: A Pigouvian taxation approach," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 2-17.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Norring, Anni, 2022. "Taming the tides of capital: Review of capital controls and macroprudential policy in emerging economies," BoF Economics Review 1/2022, Bank of Finland.
    2. Arce, Fernando & Bengui, Julien & Bianchi, Javier, 2025. "Overborrowing, underborrowing, and macroprudential policy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 227(C).
    3. Parimoo, Suneil, 2024. "Cycles and self-fulfilling crises in open economies with stock collateral constraints under impatience," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 112(C).
    4. Johannes Matschke, 2021. "Macroprudential Policy Interlinkages," Research Working Paper RWP 21-10, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
    5. Ma, Chang, 2020. "Financial stability, growth and macroprudential policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
    6. Acosta-Henao, Miguel & Alfaro, Laura & Fernández, Andrés, 2025. "Sticky capital controls," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 157(C).
    7. Julian A. Parra-Polania & Carmi�a O. Vargas, 2015. "Macroprudential vs. Ex-post Policy Interventions: when Domestic Taxes are Relevant for International Lenders," Borradores de Economia 12698, Banco de la Republica.
    8. Andreas Schabert, 2025. "Taxing versus subsidizing debt under financial frictions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 79(4), pages 1383-1420, June.
    9. Louphou Coulibaly, 2023. "Monetary Policy in Sudden Stop-Prone Economies," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 15(4), pages 141-176, October.
    10. Javier Bianchi & Enrique Mendoza, 2020. "A Fisherian Approach to Financial Crises: Lessons from the Sudden Stops Literature," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 37, pages 254-283, August.
    11. Oskolkov, Aleksei & Sorá, Marcos, 2023. "Macroprudential policy for internal financial dollarization," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(C).
    12. Ricardo M. Reyes-Heroles & Gabriel Tenorio, 2017. "Managing Capital Flows in the Presence of External Risks," International Finance Discussion Papers 1213, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    13. Korinek, Anton, 2018. "Regulating capital flows to emerging markets: An externality view," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 61-80.
    14. Ottonello, Pablo & Perez, Diego J. & Varraso, Paolo, 2022. "Are collateral-constraint models ready for macroprudential policy design?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 139(C).
    15. Javier Bianchi & Guido Lorenzoni, 2021. "The Prudential Use of Capital Controls and Foreign Currency Reserves," NBER Working Papers 29476, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Florian Schuster & Marco Wysietzki & Jonas Zdrzalek, 2023. "How Heterogeneous Beliefs Trigger Financial Crises," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 238, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    17. Carmiña O. Vargas & Julian A. Parra‐Polania, 2021. "Analysis of macro‐prudential and ex post financial crisis interventions: Relevance of the fiscal‐policy setup," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(3), pages 3759-3769, July.
    18. Herreño, Juan & Rondón-Moreno, Carlos, 2025. "Overborrowing and systemic externalities in the business cycle under imperfect information," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 157(C).
    19. Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé & Martín Uribe, 2016. "Multiple Equilibria in Open Economy Models with Collateral Constraints: Overborrowing Revisited," NBER Working Papers 22264, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. Flora Lutz & Leopold Zessner-Spitzenberg, 2019. "Sudden Stops and Reserve Accumulation in the Presence of International Liquidity Risk," Vienna Economics Papers 1907, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • F38 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Financial Policy: Financial Transactions Tax; Capital Controls
    • F41 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Open Economy Macroeconomics
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bdr:borrec:1270. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Clorith Angélica Bahos Olivera (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/brcgvco.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.