IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/joecth/v79y2025i4d10.1007_s00199-024-01615-3.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Taxing versus subsidizing debt under financial frictions

Author

Listed:
  • Andreas Schabert

    (University of Cologne)

Abstract

We examine optimal credit market policies in two models with durables/capital as collateral. Pecuniary externalities rationalize ex-ante debt taxes as macroprudential regulation, achieving constrained efficiency. Ex-post debt subsidies can implement first-best by stimulating collateral demand. Due to the same effect, debt subsidies that are constant over time can be superior to debt taxes. Saving subsidies can further enhance efficiency by addressing distributive effects of pecuniary externalities via interest rate reductions. The analysis shows that debt-increasing subsidies can outperform macroprudential regulation, and that constrained inefficiency caused by collateral externalities is insufficient to establish debt taxes as optimal credit market policies.

Suggested Citation

  • Andreas Schabert, 2025. "Taxing versus subsidizing debt under financial frictions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 79(4), pages 1383-1420, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:79:y:2025:i:4:d:10.1007_s00199-024-01615-3
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-024-01615-3
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00199-024-01615-3
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s00199-024-01615-3?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Javier Bianchi, 2011. "Overborrowing and Systemic Externalities in the Business Cycle," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(7), pages 3400-3426, December.
    2. Bilge Erten & Anton Korinek & José Antonio Ocampo, 2021. "Capital Controls: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 59(1), pages 45-89, March.
    3. Anton Korinek & Damiano Sandri, 2016. "Capital Controls or Macroprudential Regulation?," NBER Chapters, in: NBER International Seminar on Macroeconomics 2015, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Hengjie Ai & Jun E Li & Kai Li & Christian Schlag, 2020. "The Collateralizability Premium," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 33(12), pages 5821-5855.
    5. Benigno, Gianluca & Chen, Huigang & Otrok, Christopher & Rebucci, Alessandro & Young, Eric R., 2016. "Optimal capital controls and real exchange rate policies: A pecuniary externality perspective," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 147-165.
    6. James Cloyne & Kilian Huber & Ethan Ilzetzki & Henrik Kleven, 2019. "The Effect of House Prices on Household Borrowing: A New Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(6), pages 2104-2136, June.
    7. Jeanne, Olivier & Korinek, Anton, 2019. "Managing credit booms and busts: A Pigouvian taxation approach," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 2-17.
    8. Olivier Jeanne & Anton Korinek, 2010. "Excessive Volatility in Capital Flows: A Pigouvian Taxation Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(2), pages 403-407, May.
    9. Alejandro Justiniano & Giorgio E. Primiceri & Andrea Tambalotti, 2019. "Credit Supply and the Housing Boom," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 127(3), pages 1317-1350.
    10. Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé & Martín Uribe, 2017. "Is Optimal Capital Control Policy Countercyclical in Open Economy Models with Collateral Constraints?," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 65(3), pages 498-527, August.
    11. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1982. "The Inefficiency of the Stock Market Equilibrium," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 49(2), pages 241-261.
    12. Ottonello, Pablo & Perez, Diego J. & Varraso, Paolo, 2022. "Are collateral-constraint models ready for macroprudential policy design?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 139(C).
    13. Olivier Jeanne & Anton Korinek, 2020. "Macroprudential Regulation versus mopping up after the crash," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 87(3), pages 1470-1497.
    14. Fernando Arce & Julien Bengui & Javier Bianchi, 2023. "Overborrowing, Underborrowing, and Macroprudential Policy," Working Paper Series WP 2023-20, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    15. Eduardo Dávila & Anton Korinek, 2018. "Pecuniary Externalities in Economies with Financial Frictions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 85(1), pages 352-395.
    16. Guido Lorenzoni, 2008. "Inefficient Credit Booms," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 75(3), pages 809-833.
    17. Mitsuru Katagiri & Ryo Kato & Takayuki Tsuruga, 2017. "Prudential capital controls or bailouts? The impact of different collateral constraint assumptions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 63(4), pages 943-960, April.
    18. John Geanakoplos & Ana Fostel, 2008. "Leverage Cycles and the Anxious Economy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1211-1244, September.
    19. Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé & Martín Uribe, 2021. "Multiple Equilibria in Open Economies with Collateral Constraints," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 88(2), pages 969-1001.
    20. Korinek, Anton, 2018. "Regulating capital flows to emerging markets: An externality view," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 61-80.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Jeanne, Olivier & Korinek, Anton, 2019. "Managing credit booms and busts: A Pigouvian taxation approach," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 2-17.
    2. Andreas Schabert, 2021. "Optimal Corrective Policies under Financial Frictions," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 107, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    3. Korinek, Anton, 2018. "Regulating capital flows to emerging markets: An externality view," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 61-80.
    4. Bilge Erten & Anton Korinek & José Antonio Ocampo, 2021. "Capital Controls: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 59(1), pages 45-89, March.
    5. Johannes Matschke, 2021. "Macroprudential Policy Interlinkages," Research Working Paper RWP 21-10, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
    6. Norring, Anni, 2022. "Taming the tides of capital: Review of capital controls and macroprudential policy in emerging economies," BoF Economics Review 1/2022, Bank of Finland.
    7. Ma, Chang, 2020. "Financial stability, growth and macroprudential policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
    8. Florian Schuster & Marco Wysietzki & Jonas Zdrzalek, 2023. "How Heterogeneous Beliefs Trigger Financial Crises," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 238, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    9. V. Filipe Martins-Da-Rocha & Toan Phan & Yiannis Vailakis, 2022. "Pecuniary Externalities in Competitive Economies with Limited Pledgeability," Working Papers hal-03909596, HAL.
    10. Jeanne, Olivier & Sandri, Damiano, 2023. "Global financial cycle and liquidity management," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(C).
    11. Lovchikova, Marina & Matschke, Johannes, 2024. "Capital controls and the global financial cycle," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 163(C).
    12. Fabiani, Andrea & Piñeros, Martha López & Peydró, José-Luis & Soto, Paul E., 2022. "Capital controls, domestic macroprudential policy and the bank lending channel of monetary policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 139(C).
    13. Bengui, Julien & Bianchi, Javier, 2022. "Macroprudential policy with leakages," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 139(C).
    14. Kurlat, Pablo, 2021. "Investment externalities in models of fire sales," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 102-118.
    15. Korinek, Anton & Sandri, Damiano, 2016. "Capital controls or macroprudential regulation?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(S1), pages 27-42.
    16. Ottonello, Pablo & Perez, Diego J. & Varraso, Paolo, 2022. "Are collateral-constraint models ready for macroprudential policy design?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 139(C).
    17. J. Scott Davis & Michael B. Devereux, 2019. "Capital Controls as Macro-prudential Policy in a Large Open Economy," NBER Working Papers 25710, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Fontanier, Paul, 2025. "Optimal policy for behavioral financial crises," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 166(C).
    19. Parimoo, Suneil, 2024. "Cycles and self-fulfilling crises in open economies with stock collateral constraints under impatience," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 112(C).
    20. Liu, Siming, 2022. "Government spending during sudden stop crises," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 135(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Financial stability; Pecuniary externalities; Collateral constraint; Macroprudential regulation; Distributive effects;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:79:y:2025:i:4:d:10.1007_s00199-024-01615-3. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.