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Are Collateral-Constraint Models Ready for Macroprudential Policy Design?

Author

Listed:
  • Pablo Ottonello
  • Diego J. Perez
  • Paolo Varraso

Abstract

We study the design of macroprudential policies based on quantitative collateral-constraint models. We show that the desirability of macroprudential policies critically depends on the specific form of collateral used in debt contracts: While inefficiencies arise when current prices affect collateral---a frequent benchmark used to guide policies---they do not when only future prices affect collateral. Since the microfoundations and quantitative predictions of models with future-price collateral constraints do not appear less plausible than those using current prices, we conclude that additional empirical work is essential for the use of these models in macroprudential policy design.

Suggested Citation

  • Pablo Ottonello & Diego J. Perez & Paolo Varraso, 2021. "Are Collateral-Constraint Models Ready for Macroprudential Policy Design?," NBER Working Papers 29204, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:29204
    Note: AP EFG IFM ME
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    Cited by:

    1. Javier Bianchi & Guido Lorenzoni, 2021. "The Prudential Use of Capital Controls and Foreign Currency Reserves," NBER Working Papers 29476, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Lee, David, 2023. "Modeling Collateralization and Its Economic Significance," MPRA Paper 118678, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Federico Esposito & Fadi Hassan, 2023. "Import competition, trade credit and financial frictions in general equilibrium," CEP Discussion Papers dp1901, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    4. Arce, Fernando & Bengui, Julien & Bianchi, Javier, 2025. "Overborrowing, underborrowing, and macroprudential policy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 227(C).
    5. Shah, Rohan, 2024. "Financial crises with different collateral types," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 166(C).
    6. Gulan, Adam & Jokivuolle, Esa & Verona, Fabio, 2022. "Optimal bank capital requirements: What do the macroeconomic models say?," BoF Economics Review 2/2022, Bank of Finland.
    7. Carmiña O. Vargas & Julian A. Parra-Polania, 2022. "Relevance of the collateral constraint form in the analysis of financial crisis interventions," Borradores de Economia 1190, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
    8. Acosta-Henao, Miguel & Alfaro, Laura & Fernández, Andrés, 2025. "Sticky capital controls," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 157(C).
    9. Julian A. Parra-Polania & Carmina O. Vargas, 2025. "Debt Taxes During Crises, a Blessing in Disguise?," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 26(2), pages 707-730, November.
    10. Manuel Amador & Javier Bianchi, 2024. "Bank Runs, Fragility, and Regulation," NBER Working Papers 32341, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Bingbing Dong & Jieran Wu & Eric Young, 2023. "The Role of Collateral in Sudden Stop Models," China & World Economy, Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, vol. 31(6), pages 79-110, November.
    12. Andreas Schabert, 2025. "Taxing versus subsidizing debt under financial frictions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 79(4), pages 1383-1420, June.
    13. Drechsel, Thomas & Kim, Seho, 2024. "Macroprudential policy with earnings-based borrowing constraints," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 147(C).
    14. Martin Kornejew & Chen Lian & Yueran Ma & Pablo Ottonello & Diego J. Perez, 2024. "Bankruptcy Resolution and Credit Cycles," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2024, volume 39, pages 1-39, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Andrea Fabiani & Martha López & José-Luis Peydró & Paul E. Soto, 2023. "Capital Controls, Corporate Debt and Real Effects: Evidence from Boom and Crisis Times," Borradores de Economia 1244, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
    16. Gianluca Benigno & Alessandro Rebucci & Aliaksandr Zaretski, 2025. "Managing Financial Crises," NBER Working Papers 34410, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Suman Basu & Emine Boz & Gita Gopinath & Francisco Roch & Filiz Unsal, "undated". "Integrated Monetary and Financial Policies for Small Open Economies," Department of Economics Working Papers 2025-10, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
    18. Andrea Lanteri & Adriano A. Rampini, 2023. "Constrained-Efficient Capital Reallocation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 113(2), pages 354-395, February.
    19. repec:rim:rimwps:23-03 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • F32 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Current Account Adjustment; Short-term Capital Movements
    • F36 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
    • F38 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Financial Policy: Financial Transactions Tax; Capital Controls
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises

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