Bank Runs, Fragility, and Regulation
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DOI: 10.21034/wp.804
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- Manuel Amador & Javier Bianchi, 2024. "Bank Runs, Fragility, and Regulation," NBER Working Papers 32341, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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More about this item
Keywords
Self-fulfilling bank runs; Banking crises; Macroprudential policy;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
- G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
- E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-DGE-2024-07-15 (Dynamic General Equilibrium)
- NEP-MON-2024-07-15 (Monetary Economics)
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