IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/een/camaaa/2014-25.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Prudential Capital Controls or Bailouts? The Impact of Different Collateral Constraint Assumptions

Author

Listed:
  • Mitsuru Katagiri
  • Ryo Kato
  • Takayuki Tsuruga

Abstract

A fast growing literature on small open economy models with pecuniary externalities has provided the theoretical grounds for the policy analysis of macro prudential regulations. Using the framework of Jeanne and Korinek (2010), we investigate whether a subsidy on debt during crises as a form of bailout can outperform prudential capital controls. We show that the result depends on the functional form of the collateral constraint faced by households. If households collateralize their assets that they purchase at the same time as their borrowing, subsidizing debt during crises is preferable. If, on the other hand, the maximum borrowing is constrained by the value of their assets that they have purchased before they borrow, a stronger case can be made for prudential capital controls.

Suggested Citation

  • Mitsuru Katagiri & Ryo Kato & Takayuki Tsuruga, 2014. "Prudential Capital Controls or Bailouts? The Impact of Different Collateral Constraint Assumptions," CAMA Working Papers 2014-25, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
    • Handle: RePEc:een:camaaa:2014-25
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://cama.crawford.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/publication/cama_crawford_anu_edu_au/2014-03/25_2014_katagiri_kato_tsuruga.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Javier Bianchi, 2011. "Overborrowing and Systemic Externalities in the Business Cycle," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(7), pages 3400-3426, December.
    2. Schmitt-Grohe, Stephanie & Uribe, Martin, 2003. "Closing small open economy models," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 163-185, October.
    3. John Geanakoplos & William Zame, 2014. "Collateral equilibrium, I: a basic framework," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 56(3), pages 443-492, August.
    4. Anton Korinek, 2011. "The New Economics of Prudential Capital Controls: A Research Agenda," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 59(3), pages 523-561, August.
    5. Luc Laeven & Fabian Valencia, 2020. "Systemic Banking Crises Database II," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 68(2), pages 307-361, June.
    6. Uribe, Martín & Schmitt-Grohé, Stephanie, 2012. "Prudential Policy for Peggers," CEPR Discussion Papers 8961, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Javier Bianchi, 2016. "Efficient Bailouts?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(12), pages 3607-3659, December.
    8. Gianluca Benigno & Huigang Chen & Christopher Otrok & Alessandro Rebucci & Eric R. Young, 2023. "Optimal Policy for Macrofinancial Stability," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 15(4), pages 401-428, October.
    9. Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine, 1993. "Debt-Constrained Asset Markets," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 60(4), pages 865-888.
    10. Benigno, Gianluca & Chen, Huigang & Otrok, Christopher & Rebucci, Alessandro & Young, Eric R., 2016. "Optimal capital controls and real exchange rate policies: A pecuniary externality perspective," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 147-165.
    11. Anton Korinek & Alp Simsek, 2016. "Liquidity Trap and Excessive Leverage," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(3), pages 699-738, March.
    12. John Geanakoplos & Ana Fostel, 2008. "Leverage Cycles and the Anxious Economy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1211-1244, September.
    13. Mr. Edward J Frydl, 1999. "The Length and Cost of Banking Crises," IMF Working Papers 1999/030, International Monetary Fund.
    14. Javier Bianchi & Enrique G. Mendoza, 2018. "Optimal Time-Consistent Macroprudential Policy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(2), pages 588-634.
    15. Lane, Philip R. & Milesi-Ferretti, Gian Maria, 2007. "The external wealth of nations mark II: Revised and extended estimates of foreign assets and liabilities, 1970-2004," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 223-250, November.
    16. Olivier Jeanne & Anton Korinek, 2020. "Macroprudential Regulation versus mopping up after the crash," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 87(3), pages 1470-1497.
    17. Benigno, Gianluca & Chen, Huigang & Otrok, Christopher & Rebucci, Alessandro & Young, Eric R, 2012. "Optimal Policy for Macro-Financial Stability," CEPR Discussion Papers 9223, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    18. Reinhart, Carmen M. & Rogoff, Kenneth S., 2013. "Banking crises: An equal opportunity menace," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(11), pages 4557-4573.
    19. Emmanuel Farhi & Iván Werning, 2016. "A Theory of Macroprudential Policies in the Presence of Nominal Rigidities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 84, pages 1645-1704, September.
    20. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1982. "The Inefficiency of the Stock Market Equilibrium," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 49(2), pages 241-261.
    21. Emmanuel Farhi & Ivan Werning, 2012. "Dealing with the Trilemma: Optimal Capital Controls with Fixed Exchange Rates," NBER Working Papers 18199, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    22. Lane, Philip & Milesi-Ferretti, Gian Maria, "undated". "External Wealth of Nations," Instructional Stata datasets for econometrics extwealth, Boston College Department of Economics.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Jeanne, Olivier & Korinek, Anton, 2019. "Managing credit booms and busts: A Pigouvian taxation approach," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 2-17.
    2. Ottonello, Pablo & Perez, Diego J. & Varraso, Paolo, 2022. "Are collateral-constraint models ready for macroprudential policy design?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 139(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ma, Chang, 2020. "Financial stability, growth and macroprudential policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
    2. Korinek, Anton & Sandri, Damiano, 2016. "Capital controls or macroprudential regulation?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(S1), pages 27-42.
    3. Norring, Anni, 2022. "Taming the tides of capital: Review of capital controls and macroprudential policy in emerging economies," BoF Economics Review 1/2022, Bank of Finland.
    4. Devereux, Michael B. & Young, Eric R. & Yu, Changhua, 2019. "Capital controls and monetary policy in sudden-stop economies," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 52-74.
    5. Bilge Erten & Anton Korinek & José Antonio Ocampo, 2021. "Capital Controls: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 59(1), pages 45-89, March.
    6. Jeanne, Olivier & Korinek, Anton, 2019. "Managing credit booms and busts: A Pigouvian taxation approach," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 2-17.
    7. Eric Young & Alessandro Rebucci & Christopher Otrok, 2013. "Capital Controls or Real Exchange Rate Policy? A Pecuniary Externality Perspective," 2013 Meeting Papers 641, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    8. Benigno, Gianluca & Chen, Huigang & Otrok, Christopher & Rebucci, Alessandro & Young, Eric R., 2016. "Optimal capital controls and real exchange rate policies: A pecuniary externality perspective," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 147-165.
    9. Ricardo M. Reyes-Heroles & Gabriel Tenorio, 2017. "Managing Capital Flows in the Presence of External Risks," International Finance Discussion Papers 1213, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    10. Korinek, Anton, 2018. "Regulating capital flows to emerging markets: An externality view," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 61-80.
    11. J. Scott Davis & Michael B. Devereux, 2019. "Capital Controls as Macro-prudential Policy in a Large Open Economy," Globalization Institute Working Papers 358, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
    12. V. Filipe Martins-Da-Rocha & Toan Phan & Yiannis Vailakis, 2022. "Pecuniary Externalities in Competitive Economies with Limited Pledgeability," Working Papers hal-03909596, HAL.
    13. Johannes Matschke, 2021. "Macroprudential Policy Interlinkages," Research Working Paper RWP 21-10, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
    14. Flora Lutz & Leopold Zessner-Spitzenberg, 2019. "Sudden Stops and Reserve Accumulation in the Presence of International Liquidity Risk," Vienna Economics Papers 1907, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
    15. Flora Lutz & Leopold Zessner-Spitzenberg, 2019. "Sudden Stops and Reserve Accumulation in the Presence of International Liquidity Risk," Vienna Economics Papers vie1907, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
    16. Gianluca Benigno & Huigang Chen & Christopher Otrok & Alessandro Rebucci & Eric R. Young, 2023. "Optimal Policy for Macrofinancial Stability," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 15(4), pages 401-428, October.
    17. Jonathan Heathcote & Fabrizio Perri, 2016. "On the Desirability of Capital Controls," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 64(1), pages 75-102, May.
    18. Schroth, Josef, 2021. "Macroprudential policy with capital buffers," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 296-311.
    19. Enrique G. Mendoza & Eugenio Rojas, 2019. "Positive and Normative Implications of Liability Dollarization for Sudden Stops Models of Macroprudential Policy," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 67(1), pages 174-214, March.
    20. Javier Bianchi & Enrique Mendoza, 2020. "A Fisherian Approach to Financial Crises: Lessons from the Sudden Stops Literature," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 37, pages 254-283, August.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Financial crises; Credit externalities; Bailouts; Macroprudential policies;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:een:camaaa:2014-25. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Cama Admin (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/asanuau.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.