IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/bca/bocawp/21-32.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Effects of Government Licensing on E-commerce: Evidence from Alibaba

Author

Listed:
  • Ginger Zhe Jin
  • Zhentong Lu
  • Xiaolu Zhou
  • Chunxiao Li

Abstract

Using proprietary data from Alibaba, we examine how the 2015 Food Safety Law (FSL) affects e commerce in China. The FSL requires most food sellers on e-commerce platforms to obtain a valid online license for retail food handling. Because the FSL was rolled out progressively, we have a rare opportunity to observe a gradual transition from voluntary certification to partial licensing and mandatory licensing. Data summary shows that, conditional on sellers with valid licensing information, those that had a better online reputation and more online food sales before the FSL tend to display their FSL license earlier on the platform, and buyers are more willing to transact with a seller after she displays her FSL license. This positive response is stronger for younger and less reputable sellers, suggesting that the license provides useful information in addition to what consumers observe on the platform. To identify the causal impact of the FSL, we compare food and non-food categories via synthetic control matching. We find that the average quality of surviving food sellers has improved after partial and mandatory licensing, partly because those who are unwilling to obtain the FSL license must exit the platform. Despite an increase in seller concentration, the platform's gross merchandise value in the food category did not decline post FSL, nor did the average sales price increase significantly one year into the full enforcement of the FSL. This suggests that the FSL does not hamper the long-run performance of the regulated market, probably because it has enhanced seller quality and market transparency on the platform.

Suggested Citation

  • Ginger Zhe Jin & Zhentong Lu & Xiaolu Zhou & Chunxiao Li, 2021. "The Effects of Government Licensing on E-commerce: Evidence from Alibaba," Staff Working Papers 21-32, Bank of Canada.
  • Handle: RePEc:bca:bocawp:21-32
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/swp2021-32.pdf
    File Function: Full text
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dina Mayzlin & Yaniv Dover & Judith Chevalier, 2014. "Promotional Reviews: An Empirical Investigation of Online Review Manipulation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(8), pages 2421-2455, August.
    2. Scarpa, Carlo, 1998. "Minimum quality standards with more than two firms1," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 16(5), pages 665-676, September.
    3. Weijia (Daisy) Dai & Ginger Jin & Jungmin Lee & Michael Luca, 2018. "Aggregation of consumer ratings: an application to Yelp.com," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 289-339, September.
    4. Patrick Bajari & Ali Hortaçsu, 2004. "Economic Insights from Internet Auctions," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 42(2), pages 457-486, June.
    5. Gregory Lewis, 2011. "Asymmetric Information, Adverse Selection and Online Disclosure: The Case of eBay Motors," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(4), pages 1535-1546, June.
    6. Alberto Abadie & Javier Gardeazabal, 2003. "The Economic Costs of Conflict: A Case Study of the Basque Country," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 113-132, March.
    7. Leland, Hayne E, 1979. "Quacks, Lemons, and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Quality Standards," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(6), pages 1328-1346, December.
    8. Paolo Garella & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2008. "Minimum quality standards and consumers’ information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 36(2), pages 283-302, August.
    9. James W. Roberts, 2011. "Can Warranties Substitute for Reputations?," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 69-85, August.
    10. Kleiner, Morris M & Kudrle, Robert T, 2000. "Does Regulation Affect Economic Outcomes? The Case of Dentistry," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(2), pages 547-582, October.
    11. David Dranove & Ginger Zhe Jin, 2010. "Quality Disclosure and Certification: Theory and Practice," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 48(4), pages 935-963, December.
    12. Law, Marc T. & Kim, Sukkoo, 2005. "Specialization and Regulation: The Rise of Professionals and the Emergence of Occupational Licensing Regulation," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 65(3), pages 723-756, September.
    13. Michael W. Robbins & Jessica Saunders & Beau Kilmer, 2017. "A Framework for Synthetic Control Methods With High-Dimensional, Micro-Level Data: Evaluating a Neighborhood-Specific Crime Intervention," Journal of the American Statistical Association, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 112(517), pages 109-126, January.
    14. Dellarocas, Chrysanthos, 2003. "The Digitization of Word-of-mouth: Promise and Challenges of Online Feedback Mechanisms," Working papers 4296-03, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
    15. Ginger Zhe Jin & Andrew Kato, 2007. "Dividing Online and Offline: A Case Study," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 74(3), pages 981-1004.
    16. Marc T. Law & Mindy S. Marks, 2009. "Effects of Occupational Licensing Laws on Minorities: Evidence from the Progressive Era," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 52(2), pages 351-366, May.
    17. A. Frank Adams III & Robert B. Ekelund Jr. & John D. Jackson, 2003. "Occupational Licensing of a Credence Good: The Regulation of Midwifery," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 69(3), pages 659-675, January.
    18. Abadie, Alberto & Diamond, Alexis & Hainmueller, Jens, 2010. "Synthetic Control Methods for Comparative Case Studies: Estimating the Effect of California’s Tobacco Control Program," Journal of the American Statistical Association, American Statistical Association, vol. 105(490), pages 493-505.
    19. Pashigian, B Peter, 1979. "Occupational Licensing and the Interstate Mobility of Professionals," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(1), pages 1-25, April.
    20. Chrysanthos Dellarocas, 2003. "The Digitization of Word of Mouth: Promise and Challenges of Online Feedback Mechanisms," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 49(10), pages 1407-1424, October.
    21. Min Chen & Konstantinos Serfes, 2012. "Minimum quality standard regulation under imperfect quality observability," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 41(2), pages 269-291, April.
    22. Xiang Hui & Maryam Saeedi & Zeqian Shen & Neel Sundaresan, 2016. "Reputation and Regulations: Evidence from eBay," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(12), pages 3604-3616, December.
    23. Carl Shapiro, 1986. "Investment, Moral Hazard, and Occupational Licensing," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 53(5), pages 843-862.
    24. Shepard, Lawrence, 1978. "Licensing Restrictions and the Cost of Dental Care," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(1), pages 187-201, April.
    25. Morris M. Kleiner & Richard M. Todd, 2009. "Mortgage Broker Regulations That Matter: Analyzing Earnings, Employment, and Outcomes for Consumers," NBER Chapters, in: Studies of Labor Market Intermediation, pages 183-231, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    26. Uri Ronnen, 1991. "Minimum Quality Standards, Fixed Costs, and Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(4), pages 490-504, Winter.
    27. Steven Tadelis, 2016. "Reputation and Feedback Systems in Online Platform Markets," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 8(1), pages 321-340, October.
    28. Chiara Farronato & Andrey Fradkin & Bradley Larsen & Erik Brynjolfsson, 2020. "Consumer Protection in an Online World: An Analysis of Occupational Licensing," NBER Working Papers 26601, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    29. Michael Luca & Georgios Zervas, 2016. "Fake It Till You Make It: Reputation, Competition, and Yelp Review Fraud," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(12), pages 3412-3427, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Guo, Jianxin & Jin, Songqing & Zhao, Jichun & Wang, Hongbiao & Zhao, Fang, 2022. "Has COVID-19 accelerated the E-commerce of agricultural products? Evidence from sales data of E-stores in China," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 112(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Brian Meehan & E. Frank Stephenson, 2020. "Reducing a Barrier to Entry: The 120/150 CPA Licensing Rule," Journal of Labor Research, Springer, vol. 41(4), pages 382-402, December.
    2. Pagliero, Mario, 2013. "The impact of potential labor supply on licensing exam difficulty," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 141-152.
    3. Greiff, Matthias & Paetzel, Fabian, 2020. "Information about average evaluations spurs cooperation: An experiment on noisy reputation systems," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 334-356.
    4. Hui, Xiang & Klein, Tobias & Stahl, Konrad, 2022. "Learning from Online Ratings," CEPR Discussion Papers 17006, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Lingfang (Ivy) Li & Steven Tadelis & Xiaolan Zhou, 2020. "Buying reputation as a signal of quality: Evidence from an online marketplace," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(4), pages 965-988, December.
    6. Mario Pagliero, 2007. "The Impact of Potential Labor Supply on Licensing Exam Difficulty in the US Market for Lawyers," CHILD Working Papers wp19_08, CHILD - Centre for Household, Income, Labour and Demographic economics - ITALY.
    7. Xiang Hui & Meng Liu, 2022. "Quality Certificates Alleviate Consumer Aversion to Sponsored Search Advertising," CESifo Working Paper Series 9886, CESifo.
    8. Xiang Hui & Tobias J. Klein & Konrad Stahl, 2021. "When and Why Do Buyers Rate in Online Markets?," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2021_267v1, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    9. Noghanibehambari, Hamid & Fletcher, Jason, 2023. "Long-Term Health Benefits of Occupational Licensing: Evidence from Midwifery Laws," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(C).
    10. Krügel, Jan Philipp & Paetzel, Fabian, 2024. "The impact of fraud on reputation systems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 329-354.
    11. Tedi Skiti & Xueming Luo & Zhijie Lin, 2022. "When More is Less: Quality and Variety Trade‐off in Sharing Economy Platforms," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(7), pages 1817-1838, November.
    12. Kanazawa, Mark Tooru, 2023. "The Efficiency of Occupational Licensing during the Gilded and Progressive Eras: Evidence from Judicial Review," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(4), pages 1221-1252, December.
    13. Matthew Chesnes & Weijia (Daisy) Dai & Ginger Zhe Jin, 2014. "Banning Foreign Pharmacies from Sponsored Search: The Online Consumer Response," NBER Working Papers 20088, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Gesche, Tobias, 2018. "Reference Price Shifts and Customer Antagonism: Evidence from Reviews for Online Auctions," VfS Annual Conference 2018 (Freiburg, Breisgau): Digital Economy 181650, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    15. Apostolos Filippas & John J. Horton & Richard J. Zeckhauser, 2020. "Owning, Using, and Renting: Some Simple Economics of the “Sharing Economy”," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(9), pages 4152-4172, September.
    16. Mocetti, Sauro & Rizzica, Lucia & Roma, Giacomo, 2021. "Regulated occupations in Italy: Extent and labour market effects," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    17. Marek Zapletal, 2019. "The Effects of Occupational Licensing: Evidence from Business‐Level Data," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 57(4), pages 894-918, December.
    18. Xia, Xing, 2021. "Barrier to Entry or Signal of Quality? The Effects of Occupational Licensing on Minority Dental Assistants," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
    19. Marek Zapletal, 2017. "The Effects of Occupational Licensing Evidence from Detailed Business-Level Data," Working Papers 17-20, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau.
    20. Edward J. Timmons & Robert J. Thornton, 2019. "There and Back Again: The De‐Licensing and Re‐Licensing of Barbers in Alabama," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 57(4), pages 764-790, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Market structure and pricing; Recent economic and financial developments;

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
    • L81 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bca:bocawp:21-32. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/bocgvca.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.