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Can Warranties Substitute for Reputations?

Author

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  • James W. Roberts

Abstract

In markets where product quality is imperfectly observed or delivery is uncertain, seller reputations and product guarantees or warranties can impact equilibrium prices and quantities. Using data from a decentralized online market, this paper empirically investigates the substitutability of product guarantees for seller reputation. I find that a "guaranteed or your money back" promise from the market maker does not substitute for reputation, either in determining price or the probability of sale. The most likely causes of the policy's ineffectiveness are delays in buyer response to the guarantee and skepticism about reimbursement in the event of fraud. (JEL D82, L14, L15, L81, M31)

Suggested Citation

  • James W. Roberts, 2011. "Can Warranties Substitute for Reputations?," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 69-85, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:3:y:2011:i:3:p:69-85
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.3.3.69
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Joaquín Coleff, 2020. "Can consumer complaints reduce product reliability? Should we worry?," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(1), pages 74-96, January.
    2. Ajay Agrawal & Christian Catalini & Avi Goldfarb, 2014. "Some Simple Economics of Crowdfunding," Innovation Policy and the Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 14(1), pages 63-97.
    3. Hongbin Cai & Ginger Z. Jin & Chong Liu & Li-An Zhou, 2013. "More Trusting, Less Trust? An Investigation of Early E-Commerce in China," NBER Working Papers 18961, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Ginger Zhe Jin & Zhentong Lu & Xiaolu Zhou & Chunxiao Li, 2020. "The Effects of Government Licensing on E-commerce: Evidence from Alibaba," NBER Working Papers 27884, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Mordechai E. Schwarz, 2021. "Auctions with endogenous opting‐out fees and recursive winning procedures from the Talmud," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 17(4), pages 345-374, December.
    6. Ryan C. McDevitt, 2014. ""A" Business by Any Other Name: Firm Name Choice as a Signal of Firm Quality," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 122(4), pages 909-944.
    7. Casalin, Fabrizio & Dia, Enzo, 2019. "Information and reputation mechanisms in auctions of remanufactured goods," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 185-212.
    8. Jiaxin Wang & Shaohan Cai & Qinghong Xie & Lili Chen, 2022. "The influence of community engagement on seller opportunistic behaviors in e-commerce platform," Electronic Commerce Research, Springer, vol. 22(4), pages 1377-1405, December.
    9. Steffen, Nico & Wiewiorra, Lukas & Kroon, Peter, 2021. "Wettbewerb und Regulierung in der Plattform- und Datenökonomie," WIK Discussion Papers 481, WIK Wissenschaftliches Institut für Infrastruktur und Kommunikationsdienste GmbH.
    10. Franz Hackl & Agnes Kügler & Rudolf Winter-Ebmer, 2011. "Reputation and Certification in Online Shops," Economics working papers 2011-16, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
    11. Daniel W. Elfenbein & Raymond Fisman & Brian McManus, 2015. "Market Structure, Reputation, and the Value of Quality Certification," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 83-108, November.
    12. Xiang Hui & Maryam Saeedi & Zeqian Shen & Neel Sundaresan, 2016. "Reputation and Regulations: Evidence from eBay," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(12), pages 3604-3616, December.
    13. Daninger, Nathan & Gunderson, Michael A., 2017. "The Pricing and Depreciation Patterns of Used Tractors," 2017 Annual Meeting, July 30-August 1, Chicago, Illinois 258282, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    14. Han, Xintong & Li, Yushen & Wang, Tong, 2023. "Peer recognition, badge policies, and content contribution: An empirical study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 214(C), pages 691-707.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
    • L81 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce
    • M31 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Marketing and Advertising - - - Marketing

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