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Central Counterparty Risk

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  • Matthias Arnsdorf

Abstract

A clearing member of a Central Counterparty (CCP) is exposed to losses on their default fund and initial margin contributions. Such losses can be incurred whenever the CCP has insufficient funds to unwind the portfolio of a defaulting clearing member. This does not necessarily require the default of the CCP itself. In this note we aim to quantify the risk a financial institution has when facing a CCP. We show that a clearing member's CCP risk is given by a sum of exposures to each of the other clearing members. This arises because of the implicit default insurance that each member has provided in the form of mutualised, loss sharing collateral. We calculate the exposures by explicitly modeling the capital structure of a CCP as well as the loss distributions of the individual member portfolios. An important consideration in designing the model is the limited transparency with respect to the portfolio composition and collateral levels of individual clearing members. To overcome this we leverage the fact that, for a typical CCP, margin levels are risk-based. In particular, we parameterise the portfolio loss tail as a Pareto distribution and we calibrate this to the CCP defined probability of losses exceeding the posted initial margin levels. A key aspect of the model is that we explicitly take into account wrong-way risk, i.e. the fact that member defaults are more likely to occur in stressed market conditions, as well as potential contagion between a member's default and the losses on his portfolio.

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  • Matthias Arnsdorf, 2012. "Central Counterparty Risk," Papers 1205.1533, arXiv.org.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:1205.1533
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Darrell Duffie & Haoxiang Zhu, 2011. "Does a Central Clearing Counterparty Reduce Counterparty Risk?," The Review of Asset Pricing Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 1(1), pages 74-95.
    2. Bates, David & Craine, Roger, 1999. "Valuing the Futures Market Clearinghouse's Default Exposure during the 1987 Crash," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 31(2), pages 248-272, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Berndsen, Ron, 2020. "Five Fundamental Questions on Central Counterparties," Discussion Paper 2020-028, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    2. Kubitza, Christian & Pelizzon, Loriana & Getmansky, Mila, 2018. "The pitfalls of central clearing in the presence of systematic risk," ICIR Working Paper Series 31/18, Goethe University Frankfurt, International Center for Insurance Regulation (ICIR).
    3. Yannick Armenti & Stéphane Crépey, 2017. "Central Clearing Valuation Adjustment," Working Papers hal-01169169, HAL.
    4. Albanese Claudio & Armenti Yannick & Crépey Stéphane, 2020. "XVA metrics for CCP optimization," Statistics & Risk Modeling, De Gruyter, vol. 37(1-2), pages 25-53, January.
    5. Kei-Ichiro Inaba, 2018. "Liquidity and Pricing of Credit Default Swaps in Japan: Evidence from a Benchmark Index for Corporate Debt Claims," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 54(1), pages 111-143, August.
    6. Christian Kubitza & Loriana Pelizzon & Mila Getmansky Sherman, 2021. "Loss Sharing in Central Clearinghouses: Winners and Losers," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 066, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    7. Massimiliano Affinito & Matteo Piazza, 2021. "Always Look on the Bright Side? Central Counterparties and Interbank Markets during the Financial Crisis," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 17(1), pages 231-283, March.
    8. Rama Cont & Thomas Kokholm, 2013. "Central Clearing of OTC Derivatives: bilateral vs multilateral netting," Papers 1304.5065, arXiv.org.
    9. Hamed Amini & Damir Filipović & Andreea Minca, 2016. "To Fully Net or Not to Net: Adverse Effects of Partial Multilateral Netting," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 64(5), pages 1135-1142, October.
    10. Vanini, Paolo, 2012. "Fiancial Innovation, Structuring and Risk Transfer," MPRA Paper 42536, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Ron Berndsen, 2021. "Fundamental questions on central counterparties: A review of the literature," Journal of Futures Markets, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 41(12), pages 2009-2022, December.
    12. Mark Paddrik & H. Peyton Young, 2021. "Assessing the Safety of Central Counterparties," Working Papers 21-02, Office of Financial Research, US Department of the Treasury.
    13. Cont Rama & Kokholm Thomas, 2014. "Central clearing of OTC derivatives: Bilateral vs multilateral netting," Statistics & Risk Modeling, De Gruyter, vol. 31(1), pages 1-20, March.
    14. Yannick Armenti & St'ephane Cr'epey, 2015. "Central Clearing Valuation Adjustment," Papers 1506.08595, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2017.

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