IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/aim/wpaimx/2511.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Dark Side of Peers: Demotivation through Social Comparison in Networks

Author

Abstract

This paper introduces demotivation in the context of social comparison in networks. Social comparison is modeled as a status effect rewarding or penalizing agents according to their relative performance with respect to local peers. A demotivated agent faces both a reduced marginal return to effort and a psychological cost. In the absence of demotivation, social comparison leads to higher effort levels but reduces equilibrium welfare. Introducing demotivation leads to two main findings. First, it generates a network game of strategic substitutes. Second, despite the individual psychological costs incurred by demotivated agents, it can enhance overall welfare—by alleviating social pressure to exert effort and by generating positive externalities for peers.

Suggested Citation

  • Frédéric Deroïan & Mohamed Belhaj, 2025. "The Dark Side of Peers: Demotivation through Social Comparison in Networks," AMSE Working Papers 2511, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France.
    • Handle: RePEc:aim:wpaimx:2511
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/sites/default/files/working_papers/wp_2025_nr_11.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Thomas Cornelissen & Christian Dustmann & Uta Schönberg, 2017. "Peer Effects in the Workplace," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(2), pages 425-456, February.
    2. Alastair Langtry, 2023. "Keeping Up with "The Joneses": Reference-Dependent Choice with Social Comparisons," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 15(3), pages 474-500, August.
    3. Frank, Robert H, 1985. "The Demand for Unobservable and Other Nonpositional Goods," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(1), pages 101-116, March.
    4. Jeffrey T. Denning & Richard Murphy & Felix Weinhardt, 2023. "Class Rank and Long-Run Outcomes," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 105(6), pages 1426-1441, November.
    5. Robert H. Frank, 2005. "Positional Externalities Cause Large and Preventable Welfare Losses," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 137-141, May.
    6. Bellemare, Charles & Lepage, Patrick & Shearer, Bruce, 2010. "Peer pressure, incentives, and gender: An experimental analysis of motivation in the workplace," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 276-283, January.
    7. Antoni Calvó-Armengol & Eleonora Patacchini & Yves Zenou, 2009. "Peer Effects and Social Networks in Education," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 76(4), pages 1239-1267.
    8. Eriksson, Tor & Poulsen, Anders & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2009. "Feedback and incentives: Experimental evidence," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(6), pages 679-688, December.
    9. Richard Murphy & Felix Weinhardt, 2020. "Top of the Class: The Importance of Ordinal Rank," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 87(6), pages 2777-2826.
    10. Blume Lawrence E., 1993. "The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 387-424, July.
    11. Ed Hopkins & Tatiana Kornienko, 2004. "Running to Keep in the Same Place: Consumer Choice as a Game of Status," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(4), pages 1085-1107, September.
    12. Erzo F. P. Luttmer, 2005. "Neighbors as Negatives: Relative Earnings and Well-Being," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 120(3), pages 963-1002.
    13. David Gill & Victoria Prowse, 2012. "A Structural Analysis of Disappointment Aversion in a Real Effort Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(1), pages 469-503, February.
    14. Voorneveld, Mark, 2000. "Best-response potential games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 289-295, March.
    15. Clark, Andrew E. & Oswald, Andrew J., 1996. "Satisfaction and comparison income," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 359-381, September.
    16. Zhigang Cao & Haoyu Gao & Xinglong Qu & Mingmin Yang & Xiaoguang Yang, 2013. "Fashion, Cooperation, and Social Interactions," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 8(1), pages 1-14, January.
    17. Bramoullé, Y. & Ghiglino, C., 2024. "Status Consumption in Networks: A Reference Dependent Approach," Janeway Institute Working Papers 2409, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    18. Christian Ghiglino & Sanjeev Goyal, 2010. "Keeping Up with the Neighbors: Social Interaction in a Market Economy," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 8(1), pages 90-119, March.
    19. Staab, Manuel, 2024. "The formation of social groups under status concern," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 222(C).
    20. Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, 2003. "Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 70(3), pages 489-520.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Richard Murphy & Felix Weinhardt, 2020. "Top of the Class: The Importance of Ordinal Rank," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 87(6), pages 2777-2826.
    2. Lombardo, Vincenzo, 2012. "Social inclusion and the emergence of development traps," MPRA Paper 36766, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Horváth, Gergely & Jia, Mofei, 2024. "The impact of social status on the formation of collaborative ties and effort provision: An experimental study," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 113(C).
    4. Antinyan, Armenak & Horváth, Gergely & Jia, Mofei, 2020. "Positional concerns and social network structure: An experiment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).
    5. Gergely Horvath & Mofei Jia, 2024. "The impact of social status on the formation of collaborative ties and effort provision: An experimental study," Papers 2403.05830, arXiv.org.
    6. Antinyan, Armenak & Horváth, Gergely & Jia, Mofei, 2019. "Social status competition and the impact of income inequality in evolving social networks: An agent-based model," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 53-69.
    7. Beugnot, Julie & Fortin, Bernard & Lacroix, Guy & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2019. "Gender and peer effects on performance in social networks," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 207-224.
    8. Davis, Lewis S., 2018. "Political economy of growth with a taste for status," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 35-46.
    9. Staab, Manuel, 2024. "The formation of social groups under status concern," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 222(C).
    10. Beugnot, Julie & Fortin, Bernard & Lacroix, Guy & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2017. "Gender and Peer Effects in Social Networks," IZA Discussion Papers 10588, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    11. Beugnot, Julie & Fortin, Bernard & Lacroix, Guy & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2017. "Gender and Peer Effects in Social Networks," IZA Discussion Papers 10588, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    12. Vincenzo Lombardo, 2012. "Social inclusion and the emergence of development traps," Discussion Papers 13_2012, CRISEI, University of Naples "Parthenope", Italy.
    13. Antinyan, Armenak & Horváth, Gergely & Jia, Mofei, 2020. "Curbing the consumption of positional goods: Behavioral interventions versus taxation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 1-21.
    14. Inoue, Atsushi & Tanaka, Ryuichi, 2024. "The rank of socioeconomic status within a class and the incidence of school bullying and school absence," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 101(C).
    15. Ed Hopkins, 2008. "Inequality, happiness and relative concerns: What actually is their relationship?," The Journal of Economic Inequality, Springer;Society for the Study of Economic Inequality, vol. 6(4), pages 351-372, December.
    16. Aronsson, Thomas & Johansson-Stenman, Olof, 2014. "Positional preferences in time and space: Optimal income taxation with dynamic social comparisons," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 1-23.
    17. Yann Bramoullé & Christian Ghiglino, 2022. "Loss Aversion and Conspicuous Consumption in Networks," AMSE Working Papers 2206, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France.
    18. Stefano Bartolini & Ennio Bilancini & Maurizio Pugno, 2013. "Did the Decline in Social Connections Depress Americans’ Happiness?," Social Indicators Research: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal for Quality-of-Life Measurement, Springer, vol. 110(3), pages 1033-1059, February.
    19. König, Tobias & Lausen, Tobias, 2016. "Relative consumption preferences and public provision of private goods," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2016-213, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    20. Kerwin Kofi Charles & Erik Hurst & Nikolai Roussanov, 2009. "Conspicuous Consumption and Race," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 124(2), pages 425-467.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aim:wpaimx:2511. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Gregory Cornu (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/amseafr.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.