Traceability, Moral Hazard, and Food Safety
Errors in traceability can significantly impact the moral hazard associated with producing safe food. The effect of moral hazard depends on the proportion of unsafe food costs that can be allocated to the responsible producer, which depends on the efficiency of the traceability system. In this paper, we develop a model that identifies the minimum level of traceability needed to mitigate moral hazard and motivate suppliers to produce safe food. Regulators and consumer can use the results of this research to design regulations and contracts that mitigate moral hazard and motivate producers to deliver safe food.
|Date of creation:||2008|
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- Neil Doherty & Kent Smetters, 2005.
"Moral Hazard in Reinsurance Markets,"
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