Moral Hazard in Reinsurance Markets
This article attempts to identify moral hazard in the traditional reinsurance market. We build a multiperiod principal-agent model of the reinsurance transaction from which we derive predictions on premium design, monitoring, loss control, and insurer risk retention. We then use panel data on U.S. property liability reinsurance to test the model. The empirical results are consistent with the model's predictions. In particular, we find evidence for the use of loss-sensitive premiums when the insurer and reinsurer are not affiliates (i.e., not part of the same financial group), but little or no use of monitoring. In contrast, we find evidence for the extensive use of monitoring when the insurer and reinsurer are affiliates, where monitoring costs are lower. Copyright The Journal of Risk and Insurance.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 72 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.wiley.com/bw/journal.asp?ref=0022-4367&site=1|
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.wiley.com/bw/subs.asp?ref=0022-4367|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Bengt Holmstrom, 1997.
"Moral Hazard and Observability,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
1205, David K. Levine.
- Richard A. Lambert, 1983. "Long-Term Contracts and Moral Hazard," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 441-452, Autumn.
- Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, 1996.
"Financial Markets, Intermediaries and Intertemporal Smoothing,"
Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers
96-33, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
- Allen, Franklin & Gale, Douglas, 1997. "Financial Markets, Intermediaries, and Intertemporal Smoothing," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(3), pages 523-46, June.
- Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, 1995. "Financial markets, intermediaries, and intertemporal smoothing," Working Papers 95-4, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
- Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, 1995. "Financial Markets, Intermediaries, and Intertemporal Smoothing," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 95-02, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
- Jewitt, Ian, 1988. "Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1177-90, September.
- Kenneth A. Froot & Paul G.J. O'Connell, .
"On the Pricing of Intermediated Risks: Theory and Application to Catastrophe Reinsurance,"
Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers
97-24, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
- Froot, Kenneth A. & O'Connell, Paul G.J., 2008. "On the pricing of intermediated risks: Theory and application to catastrophe reinsurance," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 69-85, January.
- Kenneth A. Froot & Paul G. J. O'Connell, 1997. "On The Pricing of Intermediated Risks: Theory and Application to Catastrophe Reinsurance," NBER Working Papers 6011, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Keith J. Crocker & John Morgan, 1998. "Is Honesty the Best Policy? Curtailing Insurance Fraud through Optimal Incentive Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(2), pages 355-375, April.
- Randall Geehan, 1977. "Returns to Scale in the Life Insurance Industry," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 8(2), pages 497-514, Autumn.
- Bruce C. Greenwald & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1990.
"Asymmetric Information and the New Theory of the Firm: Financial Constraints and Risk Behavior,"
NBER Working Papers
3359, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Greenwald, Bruce C & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1990. "Asymmetric Information and the New Theory of the Firm: Financial Constraints and Risk Behavior," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(2), pages 160-65, May.
- Bond, E.W. & Crocker, K.J., 1993.
"Hardball and the Soft Touch: The Economics of Optimal Insurance Contracts with Costly State Verification and Endogenous Monitoring Costs,"
10-93-1b, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
- Bond, Eric W. & Crocker, Keith J., 1997. "Hardball and the soft touch: The economics of optimal insurance contracts with costly state verification and endogenous monitoring costs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 239-264, January.
- Froot, Kenneth A & Scharfstein, David S & Stein, Jeremy C, 1993.
" Risk Management: Coordinating Corporate Investment and Financing Policies,"
Journal of Finance,
American Finance Association, vol. 48(5), pages 1629-58, December.
- Kenneth A. Froot & David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C. Stein, 1992. "Risk Management: Coordinating Corporate Investment and Financing Policies," NBER Working Papers 4084, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Cremer, Jacques, 1995. "Arm's Length Relationships," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 110(2), pages 275-95, May.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jrinsu:v:72:y:2005:i:3:p:375-391. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.