Collective Action in Plant Breeding
Olson (1965) formulated a "Logic of Collective Action". We investigate whether a logic of collective action in plant breeding - and research and development generally - can be constructed. Using a case study on the Latin American Fund for Irrigated Rice (FLAR) as well as other real-world institutions of collective action in R&D, we construct an expanded logic of collective action, which revolves around two core features: Impure public goods and the tragedy of the anticommons. Provisions of FLAR and other institutions are related to game theory and contract theory, and theoretical, methodological and policy implications are outlined.
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