IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/h/nbr/nberch/7389.html

Wage Measurement Questions Raised by an Incomes Policy

In: The Measurement of Labor Cost

Author

Listed:
  • Donald A. Nichols

Abstract

A wage stabilization program encounters many of the fundamental wage measurement problems that also face the Bureau of Labor Statistics as well as researchers who use wage data. Because millions of dollars are at stake in the stabilization program administrator's decisions, enormous pressure is brought to bear to find solutions to these problems that are precise and simple, yet consistent. The record of such a program, then, provides an interesting perspective on wage measurement issues. In this paper I describe some of the wage measurement questions that arose during the Carter stabilization program of 1978-80 and the solutions to those questions that were adopted by the Council on Wage and Price Stability. Lessons for wage measurement are drawn, where appropriate, though many of the questions remain unanswered to this day. Specific problems discussed include those of how to value incentive pay, future value compensation, pay increases accompanying promotions or seniority and changes in the weights of a wage index. In the absence of precise answers to the measurement questions raised here no concrete answers will be available to questions about the nature of wage change over the business cycle or of the level of productivity growth over time. Wage measurement is at the heart of these fundamental macroeconomic issues.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Donald A. Nichols, 1983. "Wage Measurement Questions Raised by an Incomes Policy," NBER Chapters, in: The Measurement of Labor Cost, pages 449-462, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:7389
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c7389.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. James L. Medoff & Katharine G. Abraham, 1980. "Experience, Performance, and Earnings," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 95(4), pages 703-736.
    2. Nichols, Donald A, 1983. "Macroeconomic Determinants of Wage Adjustments in White-Collar Occupations," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 65(2), pages 203-213, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Michael Waldman, 1990. "A Signalling Explanation for Seniority Based Promotions and Other Labor Market Puzzles," UCLA Economics Working Papers 599, UCLA Department of Economics.
    2. Lloyd Ulman, 1992. "Why Should Human Resource Managers Pay High Wages?," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 30(2), pages 177-212, June.
    3. Alberto Bayo-Moriones & Jose E. Galdon-Sanchez & Maia Güell, 2010. "Is seniority-based pay used as a motivational device? Evidence from plant-level data," Research in Labor Economics, in: Jobs, Training, and Worker Well-being, pages 155-187, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    4. Peter Cappelli, 1995. "Rethinking Employment," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 33(4), pages 563-602, December.
    5. Mengistae, Taye, 1999. "The relative effects of skill formation and job matching on wage growth in Ethiopia," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2104, The World Bank.
    6. John Haltiwanger & Michael Waldman, 1984. "Insurance Aspects of Labor Market Contracting: An Overview," UCLA Economics Working Papers 348, UCLA Department of Economics.
    7. Antonio Cabrales, 2010. "The causes and economic consequences of envy," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 1(4), pages 371-386, September.
    8. Marc-Arthur Diaye & Nathalie Greenan, 2012. "The Economics of Performance Appraisals," Working Papers halshs-00856229, HAL.
    9. Cassidy, Hugh & DeVaro, Jed & Kauhanen, Antti, 2016. "Promotion signaling, gender, and turnover: New theory and evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 126(PA), pages 140-166.
    10. Jed DeVaro & Michael Waldman, 2012. "The Signaling Role of Promotions: Further Theory and Empirical Evidence," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(1), pages 91-147.
    11. Boeri, Tito & Garibaldi, Pietro & Moen, Espen R., 2017. "Inside severance pay," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 211-225.
    12. Toshiaki Tachibanaki, 2003. "The Role of Firms in Welfare Provision," NBER Chapters, in: Labor Markets and Firm Benefit Policies in Japan and the United States, pages 315-338, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. David Neumark & Wendy A. Stock, 1999. "Age Discrimination Laws and Labor Market Efficiency," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(5), pages 1081-1110, October.
    14. Catherine Haeck & Frank Verboven, 2012. "The Internal Economics of a University: Evidence from Personnel Data," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(3), pages 591-626.
    15. Ali Reza Keshavarz & Dominique Rouzies & Francis Kramarz & Bertrand Quelin & Michael Segalla, 2024. "How do firms value sales career paths?," Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, Springer, vol. 52(3), pages 762-788, May.
    16. John C. Dencker, 2012. "Who Do Firms Lay Off and Why?," Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(1), pages 152-169, January.
    17. Emmanuel Saez & Manos Matsaganis & Panos Tsakloglou, 2012. "Earnings Determination and Taxes: Evidence From a Cohort-Based Payroll Tax Reform in Greece," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 127(1), pages 493-533.
    18. repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pb:p:2373-2437 is not listed on IDEAS
    19. Waldman, Michael, 1996. "Asymmetric learning and the wage/productivity relationship," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 419-429, December.
    20. Robert Gibbons, 1996. "Incentives and Careers in Organizations," NBER Working Papers 5705, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    21. Hans Gersbach & Amihai Glazer, 2009. "High Compensation Creates a Ratchet Effect," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(539), pages 1208-1224, July.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:7389. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/nberrus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.