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The political economy of conscription

Author

Listed:
  • Poutvaara, Panu
  • Wagener, Andreas

Abstract

Though in decline recently, military conscription is still a widely used mode of staffing armies. Since not many valid economic, social or military arguments in favor of the draft can be put forward, the question emerges why societies choose to rely on it. In this survey we explain the political allure of military conscription by its specific intra- and intergenerational incidence as a tax. From a public choice perspective, there is always a vast majority of people in favor of the introduction and maintenance of military draft, as compared to a professional army. Empirical evidence for this conclusion appears to be mixed, however. Political preferences with respect to conscription involve concerns about its unfairness and questionable record on social accounts. Special interests may also matter.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Poutvaara, Panu & Wagener, Andreas, . "The political economy of conscription," Chapters in Economics,, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:lmu:muench:19807
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    Cited by:

    1. Vesa Kanniainen & Staffan Ringbom, 2018. "Security gradient and national defense – the optimal choice between a draft army and a professional army," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 29(3), pages 247-267, April.
    2. Peter Berck & Jonathan Lipow, 2011. "Military Conscription and the (Socially) Optimal Number of Boots on the Ground," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 78(1), pages 95-106, July.
    3. Antonis Adam, 2012. "Military conscription as a means of stabilizing democratic regimes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(3), pages 715-730, March.
    4. Puhani, Patrick A. & Sterrenberg, Margret K., 2021. "Effects of Mandatory Military Service on Wages and Other Socioeconomic Outcomes," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-684, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
    5. Nathaniel Mason & Charles Oyaya & Julia Boulenouar, 2020. "Reforming urban sanitation under decentralization: Cross‐country learning for Kenya and beyond," Development Policy Review, Overseas Development Institute, vol. 38(1), pages 42-63, January.
    6. Giorgio Pietro, 2013. "Military conscription and university enrolment: evidence from Italy," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 26(2), pages 619-644, April.
    7. Panu Poutvaara & Andreas Wagener, 2011. "Ending Military Conscription," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 9(02), pages 36-43, July.
    8. Patrick L. Warren, 2012. "Volunteer Militaries, The Draft, and Support for War," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(3), pages 227-258, November.
    9. Jussi Heikkilä & Ina Laukkanen, 2022. "Gender-specific Call of Duty: A Note on the Neglect of Conscription in Gender Equality Indices," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 33(5), pages 603-615, July.
    10. Frank Hubers & Dinand Webbink, 2015. "The long-term effects of military conscription on educational attainment and wages," IZA Journal of Labor Economics, Springer;Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH (IZA), vol. 4(1), pages 1-16, December.
    11. Danko Tarabar & Joshua C. Hall, 2015. "Explaining the Worldwide Decline in Military Conscription: 1970-2010," Working Papers 15-30, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.
    12. Panu Poutvaara & Andreas Wagener, 2011. "The Political Economy of Conscription," Chapters, in: Christopher J. Coyne & Rachel L. Mathers (ed.), The Handbook on the Political Economy of War, chapter 9, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    13. Yew-Kwang Ng, 2008. "Why is the Military Draft Common? Conscription and Increasing Returns," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 9(2), pages 373-384, November.
    14. Danko Tarabar & Joshua C. Hall, 2016. "Explaining the worldwide decline in the length of mandatory military service, 1970–2010," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 168(1), pages 55-74, July.
    15. Niklas Potrafke & Felix Roesel, 2020. "Opening hours of polling stations and voter turnout: Evidence from a natural experiment," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 133-163, January.
    16. Thomas Koch & Javier Birchenall, 2016. "Taking versus taxing: an analysis of conscription in a private information economy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 167(3), pages 177-199, June.
    17. Poutvaara, Panu & Wagener, Andreas, 2007. "To draft or not to draft? Inefficiency, generational incidence, and political economy of military conscription," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 975-987, December.
    18. Shu-Yi Liao & Yu-Ying Lin & Wei-Chun Tseng, 2011. "A Random Rationing Mechanism Which Reduces The Risks Of No Son Left At Home," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(3), pages 265-277.
    19. repec:ces:ifodic:v:9:y:2011:i:2:p:16134080 is not listed on IDEAS
    20. Nikitas Konstantinidis, 2020. "Military conscription, external security, and income inequality: The missing link," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 32(2), pages 312-347, April.
    21. Gonzales-Eiras, Martín & Niepelt, Dirk, 2004. "Sustaining Social Security," Seminar Papers 731, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    22. Panu Poutvaara & Andreas Wagener, 2011. "Ending Military Conscription," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 9(2), pages 36-43, 07.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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