IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Deferments and the Relative Cost of Conscription

  • Perri Tim

    ()

    (Appalachian State University)

A model of military conscription with costly deferments is developed. Deferments may enable the induction of only those with the lowest reservation wages, avoiding the usual misallocation of resources with conscription versus a volunteer military. With costly deferments, the tradeoff between conscription and a volunteer military involves the cost of deferments with the former and the higher deadweight cost of taxation with the latter. Among the results are: 1) conscription is socially preferable to a volunteer military only if a large percentage of eligible individuals is demanded by the military; 2) if conscription is used when it is socially cheaper than a volunteer military, welfare is improved if deferments have lower social benefits; and 3) ignoring other costs of conscription (e.g., higher turnover and reduced investment in human capital), the U.S. in World War II may have been near the point at which conscription and a volunteer military were of equal social cost.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bejeap.2010.10.1/bejeap.2010.10.1.2644/bejeap.2010.10.1.2644.xml?format=INT
Download Restriction: For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Article provided by De Gruyter in its journal The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy.

Volume (Year): 10 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (November)
Pages: 1-29

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:10:y:2010:i:1:n:103
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.degruyter.com

Order Information: Web: http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bejeap

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Martin Feldstein, 1995. "Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the Income Tax," NBER Working Papers 5055, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Keller, Katarina & Poutvaara, Panu & Wagener, Andreas, 2009. "Military draft and economic growth in oecd countries," Munich Reprints in Economics 19477, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  3. Casey Mulligan & Andrei Shleifer, 2004. "Conscription as Regulation," NBER Working Papers 10558, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Robert J. Barro & Chaipat Sahasakul, 1983. "Measuring the Average Marginal Tax Rate from the Individual Income Tax," NBER Working Papers 1060, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Imbens, G. & Van Der Klaauw, W., 1993. "Evaluating the Cost of Conscription in the Netherlands," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1632, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  6. Stephenson, E. Frank, 1998. "Average marginal tax rates revisited," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 389-409, April.
  7. Piero Cipollone & Alfonso Rosolia, 2007. "Social Interactions in High School: Lessons from an Earthquake," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(3), pages 948-965, June.
  8. Morten I. Lau & Panu Poutvaara & Andreas Wagener, 2004. "Dynamic Costs of the Draft," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 5(4), pages 381-406, November.
  9. Panu Poutvaara & Andreas Wagener, 2005. "To Draft or not to Draft? Efficiency, Generational Incidence, and Political Economy of Military Conscription," CESifo Working Paper Series 1454, CESifo Group Munich.
  10. Robert J. Barro & Charles J. Redlick, 2009. "Macroeconomic Effects from Government Purchases and Taxes," NBER Working Papers 15369, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. David R. Henderson, 2005. "The Role of Economists in Ending the Draft," Econ Journal Watch, Econ Journal Watch, vol. 2(2), pages 362-376, August.
  12. Beth Asch & Paul Heaton, 2008. "Monopsony and Labor Supply in the Army and Navy," Working Papers 1107, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
  13. Thomas Lemieux & David Card, 2001. "Going to College to Avoid the Draft: The Unintended Legacy of the Vietnam War," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 97-102, May.
  14. Browning, Edgar K, 1987. "On the Marginal Welfare Cost of Taxation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(1), pages 11-23, March.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:10:y:2010:i:1:n:103. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Peter Golla)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.