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Why is the Military Draft Common? Conscription and Increasing Returns

Author

Listed:
  • Yew-Kwang Ng

    (Division of Economics, Nanyang Technological University and Department of Economics, Monash University)

Abstract

It is well-known that if the required number of military personnel is large, paying the soldiers their hire may involve very high taxes. While conscription involves the inefficiency and unfairness of violating free choice, it may save significant distortionary costs of taxation. It is not well-known that, even in the absence of these distortionary costs, conscription may reduce the inequity of having very low marginal utilities for soldiers if they are paid enough to attract their voluntary services and very high marginal utilities for civilians if they have to pay very high taxes. Having all citizens serving an equal fraction of time may be inefficient as there are high degrees of increasing returns in military services due to both training costs and learning by doing. Conscription may then increase the expected utilities of all individuals.

Suggested Citation

  • Yew-Kwang Ng, 2008. "Why is the Military Draft Common? Conscription and Increasing Returns," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 9(2), pages 373-384, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:cuf:journl:y:2008:v:9:i:2:p:373-384
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    8. Panu Poutvaara & Andreas Wagener, 2007. "Conscription: Economic costs and political allure," Economics of Peace and Security Journal, EPS Publishing, vol. 2(1), pages 6-15, January.
    9. Pak Shun Ng, 2005. ""Why Not A Volunteer Army?" Reexamining The Impact Of Military Conscription On Economic Growth For Singapore," The Singapore Economic Review (SER), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 50(01), pages 47-67.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Peter Berck & Jonathan Lipow, 2011. "Military Conscription and the (Socially) Optimal Number of Boots on the Ground," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 78(1), pages 95-106, July.
    2. Jonathan Lipow & Jay Simon, 2014. "Probability segmenting and the social cost of draft evasion," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 34(1), pages 307-312.
    3. Danko Tarabar & Joshua C. Hall, 2015. "Explaining the Worldwide Decline in Military Conscription: 1970-2010," Working Papers 15-30, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.
    4. Danko Tarabar & Joshua C. Hall, 2016. "Explaining the worldwide decline in the length of mandatory military service, 1970–2010," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 168(1), pages 55-74, July.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Conscription; Draft; Increasing returns; Efficiency; Equity; Fairness;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
    • H80 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - General
    • H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War

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