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Rui Zhao

Personal Details

First Name:Rui
Middle Name:
Last Name:Zhao
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pzh273
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
http://www.albany.edu/~rzhao
Department of Economics BA 110 1400 Washington Avenue Albany, NY 12222
Terminal Degree:2001 Department of Economics; University of Minnesota (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Department of Economics
State University of New York-Albany (SUNY)

Albany, New York (United States)
http://www.albany.edu/econ/

: (518) 442-4735
(518) 442-4736
Department of Economics, BA-110, Albany, NY 12222
RePEc:edi:dealbus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Rui Ray Zhao, 2004. "Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading with Cooperative Investment," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 527, Econometric Society.
  2. Rui Zhao, 2001. "Repeated Two-Sided Moral Hazard," Discussion Papers 01-07, University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics.
  3. Rui Zhao, 2001. "On Renegotiation-Proof Contracts in Repeated Agency," Discussion Papers 01-06, University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics.

Articles

  1. Zhao, Rui R., 2012. "Renegotiation and conflict resolution in relational contracting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 964-983.
  2. Zhao, Rui R., 2009. "Productive low morale," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 18-22, April.
  3. Zhao, Rui R., 2008. "Rigidity in bilateral trade with holdup," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 3(1), March.
  4. Rui R. Zhao, 2008. "All-or-Nothing Monitoring," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1619-1628, September.
  5. Zhao, Rui R., 2007. "Dynamic risk-sharing with two-sided moral hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 601-640, September.
  6. Zhao, Rui R., 2006. "Renegotiation-proof contract in repeated agency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 263-281, November.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Rui Zhao, 2001. "Repeated Two-Sided Moral Hazard," Discussion Papers 01-07, University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Hiroshi Osano & Keiichi Hori, 2013. "Managerial Incentives and the Role of Advisors in the Continuous-Time Agency Model," KIER Working Papers 863, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
    2. Antonio Mele, 2008. "Repeated Moral Hazard and Recursive Lagrangeans," 2008 Meeting Papers 482, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    3. Karel Janda, 2006. "Lender and Borrower as Principal and Agent," Working Papers IES 2006/24, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Jul 2006.
    4. Michail Anthropelos, 2012. "The Effect of Market Power on Risk-Sharing," Papers 1206.0384, arXiv.org, revised May 2016.
    5. Philipp Renner & Karl Schmedders, 2017. "Dynamic Principal–Agent Models," Working Papers 203620456, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.

  2. Rui Zhao, 2001. "On Renegotiation-Proof Contracts in Repeated Agency," Discussion Papers 01-06, University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Wang, Cheng, 2005. "Termination of Dynamic Contracts in an Equilibrium Labor Market Model," Staff General Research Papers Archive 12403, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.

Articles

  1. Zhao, Rui R., 2009. "Productive low morale," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 18-22, April.

    Cited by:

    1. Gary-Bobo, Robert J. & Jaaidane, Touria, 2014. "Strikes and slowdown in a theory of relational contracts," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 89-116.
    2. Zhao, Rui R., 2012. "Renegotiation and conflict resolution in relational contracting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 964-983.

  2. Zhao, Rui R., 2008. "Rigidity in bilateral trade with holdup," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 3(1), March.

    Cited by:

    1. Che, Yeon-Koo & Iossa, Elisabetta & Rey, Patrick, 2017. "Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation," CEPR Discussion Papers 11904, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Krähmer, Daniel, 2012. "Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(1), pages 118-141.
    3. Vasconcelos, Luis, 2006. "Contractual signalling, relationship-specific investment and exclusive agreements," FEUNL Working Paper Series wp495, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia.
    4. Maria Goltsman, 2011. "Optimal information transmission in a holdup problem," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 42(3), pages 495-526, September.
    5. Kazumi Hori, 2014. "Contracting for Multiple Goods under Asymmetric Information: The Two-goods Case," KIER Working Papers 888, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.

  3. Rui R. Zhao, 2008. "All-or-Nothing Monitoring," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1619-1628, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Christian Espinosa & Juan Gorigoitía & Carlos Maquieira, 2012. "Nonlinear behaviour of EMBI index:the case of eastern European countries," Working Papers 37, Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Universidad Diego Portales.
    2. Balmaceda, Felipe, 2016. "Optimal task assignments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 1-18.
    3. Gregory Phelan, 2017. "Correlated Default and Financial Intermediation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 72(3), pages 1253-1284, June.
    4. Felipe Balmaceda, 2013. "On the Optimality of One-size-fits-all Contracts: The Limited Liability Case," Working Papers 39, Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Universidad Diego Portales.
    5. White, Ben & Sadler, Rohan, 2012. "Optimal conservation investment for a biodiversity-rich agricultural landscape," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 0(Issue 1), pages 1-21, March.
    6. Chen Liang & Yili Hong & Bin Gu, 2017. "Home Bias in Global Employment," Working Papers 17-06, NET Institute.
    7. Tigran Melkonyan & Michael H. Taylor, 2013. "Regulatory Policy Design for Agroecosystem Management on Public Rangelands," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 95(3), pages 606-627.
    8. David, Guy & Saynisch, Philip A. & Smith-McLallen, Aaron, 2018. "The economics of patient-centered care," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 60-77.
    9. Dunia López-Pintado & Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, 2011. "On the optimal management of teams under budget constraints," Working Papers 11.11, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics.
    10. David Rietzke & Yu Chen, 2018. "Push or Pull? Performance-Pay, Incentives, and Information Search," Graz Economics Papers 2018-12, University of Graz, Department of Economics.
    11. Fich, Eliezer M. & Starks, Laura T. & Yore, Adam S., 2014. "CEO deal-making activities and compensation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(3), pages 471-492.
    12. Chen Liang & Yili Hong & Bin Gu, 2016. "Effects of IT-enabled Monitoring on Labor Contracting in Online Platforms: Evidence from a Natural Experiment," Working Papers 16-01, NET Institute.

  4. Zhao, Rui R., 2007. "Dynamic risk-sharing with two-sided moral hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 601-640, September.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  5. Zhao, Rui R., 2006. "Renegotiation-proof contract in repeated agency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 263-281, November.

    Cited by:

    1. Wang, Cheng, 2005. "Termination of Dynamic Contracts in an Equilibrium Labor Market Model," Staff General Research Papers Archive 12403, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    2. Ayça Kaya & Galina Vereshchagina, 2015. "Moral hazard and sorting in a market for partnerships," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 60(1), pages 73-121, September.
    3. At, Christian & Gabuthy, Yannick, 2015. "Moral hazard and agency relationship in sequential litigation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 86-90.
    4. Zhao, Rui R., 2007. "Dynamic risk-sharing with two-sided moral hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 601-640, September.
    5. Susanne Ohlendorf & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2012. "Repeated Moral Hazard And Contracts With Memory: The Case Of Risk‐Neutrality," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 53(2), pages 433-452, May.
    6. Mareike Schoop & Frank Köhne & Dirk Staskiewicz & Markus Voeth & Uta Herbst, 2008. "The antecedents of renegotiations in practice—an exploratory analysis," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 127-139, March.

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