On Renegotiation-Proof Contracts in Repeated Agency
In this paper I study ``renegotiation-proof" contracts in infinite-horizon principal-agent environment. A concept of renegotiation-proofness is adopted, which not only has the appeal of intuitively generalizing its counterpart in finite-horizon environment but proves to be a powerful device for characterizing the allocations that satisfy the notion. It is shown that renegotiation-proof contracts exist under broad conditions and admit simple characterizations.
|Date of creation:||2001|
|Date of revision:|
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- In-Uck Park, 2004. "Moral Hazard Contracting and Private Credit Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(3), pages 701-746, 05.
- Stephen E. Spear & Sanjay Srivastava, 1987. "On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 54(4), pages 599-617.
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