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Kevin He

Personal Details

First Name:Kevin
Middle Name:
Last Name:He
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:phe605
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
https://kevinhe.net
Terminal Degree:2019 Department of Economics; Harvard University (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Department of Economics
University of Pennsylvania

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (United States)
http://www.econ.upenn.edu/
RePEc:edi:deupaus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Krishna Dasaratha & Kevin He, 2022. "Learning from Viral Content," Papers 2210.01267, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2023.
  2. Daniel Clark & Drew Fudenberg & Kevin He, 2022. "Observability, Dominance, and Induction in Learning Models," Papers 2201.00776, arXiv.org.
  3. Kevin He & Fedor Sandomirskiy & Omer Tamuz, 2021. "Private Private Information," Papers 2112.14356, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2024.
  4. Federico Echenique & Kevin He, 2021. "Screening $p$-Hackers: Dissemination Noise as Bait," Papers 2103.09164, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2024.
  5. Kevin He & Jonathan Libgober, 2020. "Evolutionarily Stable (Mis)specifications: Theory and Applications," Papers 2012.15007, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2023.
  6. Krishna Dasaratha & Kevin He, 2019. "Aggregative Efficiency of Bayesian Learning in Networks," Papers 1911.10116, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2024.
  7. Jetlir Duraj & Kevin He, 2019. "Dynamic Information Design with Diminishing Sensitivity Over News," Papers 1908.00084, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2023.
  8. Krishna Dasaratha & Kevin He, 2019. "An Experiment on Network Density and Sequential Learning," Papers 1909.02220, arXiv.org, revised May 2021.
  9. Kevin He, 2018. "Mislearning from Censored Data: The Gambler's Fallacy and Other Correlational Mistakes in Optimal-Stopping Problems," Papers 1803.08170, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2021.
  10. Krishna Dasaratha & Kevin He, 2017. "Network Structure and Naive Sequential Learning," Papers 1703.02105, arXiv.org, revised May 2020.
  11. Drew Fudenberg & Kevin He, 2017. "Payoff Information and Learning in Signaling Games," Papers 1709.01024, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2020.
  12. Drew Fudenberg & Kevin He, 2017. "Learning and Type Compatibility in Signaling Games," Papers 1702.01819, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2018.
  13. Drew Fudenberg & Kevin He, 2017. "Player-Compatible Learning and Player-Compatible Equilibrium," Papers 1712.08954, arXiv.org, revised May 2020.
  14. Drew Fudenberg & Kevin He & Lorens Imhof, 2016. "Bayesian Posteriors For Arbitrarily Rare Events," Papers 1608.05002, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2017.

Articles

  1. Duraj, Jetlir & He, Kevin, 2024. "Dynamic information preference and communication with diminishing sensitivity over news," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(3), July.
  2. Federico Echenique & Kevin He, 2024. "Screening p -hackers: Dissemination noise as bait," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 121(21), pages 2400787121-, May.
  3. He, Kevin, 2022. "Mislearning from censored data: The gambler's fallacy and other correlational mistakes in optimal-stopping problems," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(3), July.
  4. Clark, Daniel & Fudenberg, Drew & He, Kevin, 2022. "Observability, dominance, and induction in learning models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 206(C).
  5. Dasaratha, Krishna & He, Kevin, 2021. "An experiment on network density and sequential learning," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 182-192.
  6. Fudenberg, Drew & He, Kevin, 2021. "Player-compatible learning and player-compatible equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 194(C).
  7. Dasaratha, Krishna & He, Kevin, 2020. "Network structure and naive sequential learning," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(2), May.
  8. Fudenberg, Drew & He, Kevin, 2020. "Payoff information and learning in signaling games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 96-120.
  9. Drew Fudenberg & Kevin He, 2018. "Learning and Type Compatibility in Signaling Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 86(4), pages 1215-1255, July.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Krishna Dasaratha & Kevin He, 2022. "Learning from Viral Content," Papers 2210.01267, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2023.

    Cited by:

    1. Tuval Danenberg & Drew Fudenberg, 2024. "Endogenous Attention and the Spread of False News," Papers 2406.11024, arXiv.org.

  2. Daniel Clark & Drew Fudenberg & Kevin He, 2022. "Observability, Dominance, and Induction in Learning Models," Papers 2201.00776, arXiv.org.

    Cited by:

    1. Fudenberg, Drew & Lanzani, Giacomo & Strack, Philipp, 2023. "Pathwise concentration bounds for Bayesian beliefs," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(4), November.

  3. Kevin He & Jonathan Libgober, 2020. "Evolutionarily Stable (Mis)specifications: Theory and Applications," Papers 2012.15007, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2023.

    Cited by:

    1. Jehiel, Philippe & Mohlin, Erik, 2021. "Cycling and Categorical Learning in Decentralized Adverse Selection Economies," Working Papers 2021:11, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    2. Cuimin Ba, 2021. "Robust Misspecified Models and Paradigm Shifts," Papers 2106.12727, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2023.
    3. Drew Fudenberg & Giacomo Lanzani & Philipp Strack, 2021. "Limit Points of Endogenous Misspecified Learning," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(3), pages 1065-1098, May.
    4. Frick, Mira & , & Ishii, Yuhta, 2021. "Welfare Comparisons for Biased Learning," CEPR Discussion Papers 16833, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

  4. Krishna Dasaratha & Kevin He, 2019. "Aggregative Efficiency of Bayesian Learning in Networks," Papers 1911.10116, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2024.

    Cited by:

    1. Pablo Durán-Santomil & Luís Otero-González, 2022. "Capital Allocation Methods under Solvency II: A Comparative Analysis," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 10(3), pages 1-14, January.
    2. Mira Frick & Ryota Iijima & Yuhta Ishii, 2021. "Learning Efficiency of Multi-Agent Information Structures," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2299R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Dec 2021.
    3. Bikhchandani, Sushil & Hirshleifer, David & Tamuz, Omer & Welch, Ivo, 2021. "Information Cascades and Social Learning," MPRA Paper 107927, University Library of Munich, Germany.

  5. Krishna Dasaratha & Kevin He, 2019. "An Experiment on Network Density and Sequential Learning," Papers 1909.02220, arXiv.org, revised May 2021.

    Cited by:

    1. Dasaratha, Krishna & He, Kevin, 2020. "Network structure and naive sequential learning," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(2), May.
    2. Mueller-Frank, Manuel, 2024. "As strong as the weakest node: The impact of misinformation in social networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 215(C).

  6. Kevin He, 2018. "Mislearning from Censored Data: The Gambler's Fallacy and Other Correlational Mistakes in Optimal-Stopping Problems," Papers 1803.08170, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2021.

    Cited by:

    1. Kevin He & Jonathan Libgober, 2021. "Evolutionarily Stable (Mis)specifications:Theory and Applications," PIER Working Paper Archive 21-020, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    2. Luca Braghieri, 2023. "Biased Decoding and the Foundations of Communication," CESifo Working Paper Series 10432, CESifo.
    3. Gagnon-Bartsch, Tristan & Bushong, Benjamin, 2022. "Learning with misattribution of reference dependence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 203(C).
    4. Itai Arieli & Yakov Babichenko & Stephan Muller & Farzad Pourbabaee & Omer Tamuz, 2023. "The Hazards and Benefits of Condescension in Social Learning," Papers 2301.11237, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2024.
    5. Mira Frick & Ryota Iijima & Yuhta Ishii, 2019. "Misinterpreting Others and the Fragility of Social Learning," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2160R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Mar 2020.
    6. Mira Frick & Ryota Iijima & Yuhta Ishii, 2023. "Belief Convergence under Misspecified Learning: A Martingale Approach," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 90(2), pages 781-814.
    7. J. Aislinn Bohren & Daniel N. Hauser, 2023. "Behavioral Foundations of Model Misspecification," PIER Working Paper Archive 23-007, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    8. Takeshi Murooka & Yuichi Yamamoto, 2021. "Misspecified Bayesian Learning by Strategic Players: First-Order Misspecification and Higher-Order Misspecification," OSIPP Discussion Paper 21E008, Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University.
    9. Ba, Cuimin & Gindin, Alice, 2023. "A multi-agent model of misspecified learning with overconfidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 315-338.
    10. Ignacio Esponda & Demian Pouzo & Yuichi Yamamoto, 2019. "Asymptotic Behavior of Bayesian Learners with Misspecified Models," Papers 1904.08551, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2019.
    11. Yingkai Li & Harry Pei, 2020. "Misspecified Beliefs about Time Lags," Papers 2012.07238, arXiv.org.
    12. Fudenberg, Drew & Lanzani, Giacomo & Strack, Philipp, 2023. "Pathwise concentration bounds for Bayesian beliefs," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(4), November.

  7. Krishna Dasaratha & Kevin He, 2017. "Network Structure and Naive Sequential Learning," Papers 1703.02105, arXiv.org, revised May 2020.

    Cited by:

    1. Kevin He & Jonathan Libgober, 2021. "Evolutionarily Stable (Mis)specifications:Theory and Applications," PIER Working Paper Archive 21-020, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    2. Enrique Urbano Arellano & Xinyang Wang, 2023. "Social Learning of General Rules," Papers 2310.15861, arXiv.org.
    3. Li, Wei & Tan, Xu, 2020. "Locally Bayesian learning in networks," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(1), January.
    4. Elchanan Mossel & Manuel Mueller‐Frank & Allan Sly & Omer Tamuz, 2020. "Social Learning Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(3), pages 1235-1267, May.
    5. Mira Frick & Ryota Iijima & Yuhta Ishii, 2019. "Misinterpreting Others and the Fragility of Social Learning," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2160R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Mar 2020.
    6. Mueller-Frank, Manuel, 2024. "As strong as the weakest node: The impact of misinformation in social networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 215(C).
    7. Sadler, Evan, 2020. "Innovation adoption and collective experimentation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 121-131.
    8. Krishna Dasaratha & Kevin He, 2019. "An Experiment on Network Density and Sequential Learning," Papers 1909.02220, arXiv.org, revised May 2021.
    9. Frick, Mira & , & Ishii, Yuhta, 2021. "Belief Convergence under Misspecified Learning: A Martingale Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 16788, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Simon Board & Moritz Meyer‐ter‐Vehn, 2021. "Learning Dynamics in Social Networks," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(6), pages 2601-2635, November.
    11. Mira Frick & Ryota Iijima & Yuhta Ishii, 2020. "Belief Convergence under Misspecified Learning: A Martingale Approach," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2235R3, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Apr 2022.
    12. Mira Frick & Ryota Iijima & Yuhta Ishii, 2020. "Stability and Robustness in Misspecified Learning Models," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2235, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.

  8. Drew Fudenberg & Kevin He, 2017. "Payoff Information and Learning in Signaling Games," Papers 1709.01024, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2020.

    Cited by:

    1. Dominiak, Adam & Lee, Dongwoo, 2023. "Testing rational hypotheses in signaling games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 160(C).
    2. Fudenberg, Drew & He, Kevin, 2021. "Player-compatible learning and player-compatible equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 194(C).
    3. Nishimura, Takeshi, 2022. "Informed principal problems in bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    4. Drew Fudenberg & Giacomo Lanzani & Philipp Strack, 2021. "Limit Points of Endogenous Misspecified Learning," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(3), pages 1065-1098, May.
    5. Daniel Clark & Drew Fudenberg & Kevin He, 2022. "Observability, Dominance, and Induction in Learning Models," PIER Working Paper Archive 22-003, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    6. Daniel Clark & Drew Fudenberg, 2021. "Justified Communication Equilibrium," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(9), pages 3004-3034, September.

  9. Drew Fudenberg & Kevin He, 2017. "Learning and Type Compatibility in Signaling Games," Papers 1702.01819, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2018.

    Cited by:

    1. In-Koo Cho & Jonathan Libgober, 2021. "Machine Learning for Strategic Inference," Papers 2101.09613, arXiv.org.
    2. Fudenberg, Drew & He, Kevin, 2021. "Player-compatible learning and player-compatible equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 194(C).
    3. Milgrom, Paul & Mollner, Joshua, 2021. "Extended proper equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 194(C).
    4. Drew Fudenberg & Kevin He, 2017. "Payoff Information and Learning in Signaling Games," Papers 1709.01024, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2020.
    5. Battigalli, P. & Francetich, A. & Lanzani, G. & Marinacci, M., 2019. "Learning and self-confirming long-run biases," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 740-785.
    6. Daniel Clark & Drew Fudenberg & Kevin He, 2022. "Observability, Dominance, and Induction in Learning Models," PIER Working Paper Archive 22-003, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    7. Daniel Clark & Drew Fudenberg, 2021. "Justified Communication Equilibrium," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(9), pages 3004-3034, September.
    8. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Emiliano Catonini, 2022. "The Epistemic Spirit of Divinity," Working Papers 681, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    9. Fudenberg, Drew & Lanzani, Giacomo & Strack, Philipp, 2023. "Pathwise concentration bounds for Bayesian beliefs," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(4), November.
    10. Harry Pei, 2023. "Reputation Effects with Endogenous Records," Papers 2308.13956, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2023.

  10. Drew Fudenberg & Kevin He, 2017. "Player-Compatible Learning and Player-Compatible Equilibrium," Papers 1712.08954, arXiv.org, revised May 2020.

    Cited by:

    1. Milgrom, Paul & Mollner, Joshua, 2021. "Extended proper equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 194(C).
    2. Daniel Clark & Drew Fudenberg & Kevin He, 2022. "Observability, Dominance, and Induction in Learning Models," PIER Working Paper Archive 22-003, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.

  11. Drew Fudenberg & Kevin He & Lorens Imhof, 2016. "Bayesian Posteriors For Arbitrarily Rare Events," Papers 1608.05002, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2017.

    Cited by:

    1. Fudenberg, Drew & He, Kevin, 2021. "Player-compatible learning and player-compatible equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 194(C).
    2. Drew Fudenberg & Giacomo Lanzani & Philipp Strack, 2021. "Limit Points of Endogenous Misspecified Learning," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(3), pages 1065-1098, May.
    3. Daniel Clark & Drew Fudenberg & Kevin He, 2022. "Observability, Dominance, and Induction in Learning Models," PIER Working Paper Archive 22-003, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.

Articles

  1. He, Kevin, 2022. "Mislearning from censored data: The gambler's fallacy and other correlational mistakes in optimal-stopping problems," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(3), July.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Clark, Daniel & Fudenberg, Drew & He, Kevin, 2022. "Observability, dominance, and induction in learning models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 206(C).
    See citations under working paper version above.
  3. Dasaratha, Krishna & He, Kevin, 2021. "An experiment on network density and sequential learning," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 182-192.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  4. Fudenberg, Drew & He, Kevin, 2021. "Player-compatible learning and player-compatible equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 194(C).
    See citations under working paper version above.
  5. Dasaratha, Krishna & He, Kevin, 2020. "Network structure and naive sequential learning," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(2), May.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  6. Fudenberg, Drew & He, Kevin, 2020. "Payoff information and learning in signaling games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 96-120.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  7. Drew Fudenberg & Kevin He, 2018. "Learning and Type Compatibility in Signaling Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 86(4), pages 1215-1255, July.
    See citations under working paper version above.Sorry, no citations of articles recorded.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 13 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (11) 2016-08-21 2017-02-12 2017-03-12 2017-09-10 2018-01-15 2018-04-09 2019-08-19 2019-12-09 2021-02-01 2022-01-24 2022-02-07. Author is listed
  2. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (9) 2017-02-12 2017-03-12 2017-09-10 2018-01-15 2019-12-09 2021-02-01 2022-01-24 2022-02-07 2022-10-31. Author is listed
  3. NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (3) 2018-01-15 2019-09-16 2022-02-07
  4. NEP-NET: Network Economics (3) 2017-03-12 2019-09-16 2022-10-31
  5. NEP-DES: Economic Design (2) 2019-08-19 2022-01-24
  6. NEP-URE: Urban and Real Estate Economics (2) 2017-03-12 2019-09-16
  7. NEP-EVO: Evolutionary Economics (1) 2021-02-01
  8. NEP-HPE: History and Philosophy of Economics (1) 2018-01-15
  9. NEP-PAY: Payment Systems and Financial Technology (1) 2022-10-31
  10. NEP-UPT: Utility Models and Prospect Theory (1) 2019-08-19

Corrections

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