Report NEP-DES-2019-08-19
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Geoffroy de Clippel & Kfir Eliaz & Daniel Fershtman & Kareen Rozen, 2019, "On Selecting the Right Agent," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2019_116, Aug.
- Albrecht, James & Cai, Xiaoming & Gautier, Pieter A. & Vroman, Susan, 2019, "Multiple Applications, Competing Mechanisms, and Market Power," IZA Discussion Papers, IZA Network @ LISER, number 12512, Jul.
- Deniz Kattwinkel & Jan Knoepfle, 2019, "Costless Information and Costly Verification: A Case for Transparency," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2019_114, Jul.
- Jetlir Duraj & Kevin He, 2019, "Dynamic Information Design with Diminishing Sensitivity Over News," Papers, arXiv.org, number 1908.00084, Jul, revised Jan 2023.
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