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Thomas Groll

Personal Details

First Name:Thomas
Middle Name:
Last Name:Groll
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pgr407
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
http://www.columbia.edu/~tg2451/
School of International and Public Affairs Columbia University 420 W118th Street, Mailcode 3323 13th Floor New York, NY 10027 USA
Twitter: @tgrollecon
Terminal Degree:2012 Department of Economics; University of Oregon (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA)
Columbia University

New York City, New York (United States)
http://www.sipa.columbia.edu/
RePEc:edi:siclbus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Christopher J. Ellis & Thomas Groll, 2018. "Who Lobbies Whom? Special Interests and Hired Guns," CESifo Working Paper Series 7367, CESifo.
  2. Thomas Groll & Anja Prummer, 2016. "Whom to Lobby? Targeting in Political Networks," Working Papers 808, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
  3. Thomas Groll & Christopher J. Ellis, 2016. "Repeated Lobbying by Commercial Lobbyists and Special Interests," CESifo Working Paper Series 5809, CESifo.
  4. Thomas Groll & Christopher J. Ellis, 2013. "Dynamic Commercial Lobbying," CESifo Working Paper Series 4114, CESifo.
  5. Thomas Groll & Christopher J. Ellis, 2013. "A Simple Model of the Commercial Lobbying Industry," CESifo Working Paper Series 4110, CESifo.
  6. Thomas Groll & Peter J. Lambert, 2011. "The pro-poorness, growth and inequality nexus: Some findings from a simulation study," Working Papers 214, ECINEQ, Society for the Study of Economic Inequality.

    repec:qmw:qmwecw:wp808 is not listed on IDEAS

Articles

  1. Groll, Thomas & O’Halloran, Sharyn & McAllister, Geraldine, 2021. "Delegation and the regulation of U.S. financial markets," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
  2. Ellis, Christopher J. & Groll, Thomas, 2020. "Strategic Legislative Subsidies: Informational Lobbying and the Cost of Policy," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 114(1), pages 179-205, February.
  3. Thomas Groll & Christopher J. Ellis, 2017. "Repeated Lobbying By Commercial Lobbyists And Special Interests," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(4), pages 1868-1897, October.
  4. Thomas Groll & Maggie McKinley, 2015. "Modern Lobbying: A Relationship Market," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 13(03), pages 15-22, October.
  5. Groll, Thomas & Ellis, Christopher J., 2014. "A simple model of the commercial lobbying industry," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 299-316.
  6. Thomas Groll & Peter J. Lambert, 2013. "The Pro-Poorness, Growth and Inequality Nexus: Some Findings From a Simulation Study," Review of Income and Wealth, International Association for Research in Income and Wealth, vol. 59(4), pages 776-784, December.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Christopher J. Ellis & Thomas Groll, 2018. "Who Lobbies Whom? Special Interests and Hired Guns," CESifo Working Paper Series 7367, CESifo.

    Cited by:

    1. Oliver Huwyler, 2020. "Interest groups in the European Union and their hiring of political consultancies," European Union Politics, , vol. 21(2), pages 333-354, June.

  2. Thomas Groll & Anja Prummer, 2016. "Whom to Lobby? Targeting in Political Networks," Working Papers 808, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.

    Cited by:

    1. Marco Battaglini & Eleonora Patacchini, 2018. "Influencing Connected Legislators," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(6), pages 2277-2322.
    2. Anja Prummer, 2016. "Spatial Advertisement in Political Campaigns," Working Papers 805, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    3. Dellis, Arnaud, 2023. "Legislative informational lobbying," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
    4. James Rockey & Nadia Zakir, 2021. "Power and the money, money and the power: A network analysis of donations from American corporate to political leaders," Discussion Papers 21-03, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
    5. Prummer, Anja, 2020. "Micro-targeting and polarization," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).

  3. Thomas Groll & Christopher J. Ellis, 2016. "Repeated Lobbying by Commercial Lobbyists and Special Interests," CESifo Working Paper Series 5809, CESifo.

    Cited by:

    1. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2020. "Subpoena power and informational lobbying," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 32(2), pages 188-234, April.
    2. Matilde Bombardini & Francesco Trebbi, 2019. "Empirical Models of Lobbying," NBER Working Papers 26287, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Lepp l , Samuli, 2018. "Partial Exclusivity Can Resolve The Empirical Puzzles Associated With Rent-Seeking Activities," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2018/25, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
    4. Le, Thanh & Yalcin, Erkan, 2018. "Lobbying, campaign contributions, and electoral competition," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 559-572.
    5. Thieme, Sebastian, 2024. "(When) are Lobbying Expenditures a Good Proxy for Lobbying Activity?," IAST Working Papers 24-160, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST).
    6. Thomas Groll & Maggie McKinley, 2015. "Modern Lobbying: A Relationship Market," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 13(03), pages 15-22, October.
    7. Oliver Huwyler, 2020. "Interest groups in the European Union and their hiring of political consultancies," European Union Politics, , vol. 21(2), pages 333-354, June.
    8. Hanzhe Li, 2022. "Transparency and Policymaking with Endogenous Information Provision," Papers 2204.08876, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2023.
    9. Brittany Feor & Blair Long & Eric Richert, 2018. "Who Uses Commercial Lobbying Firms," Working Paper 1409, Economics Department, Queen's University.
    10. Martin Gregor, 2016. "Tullock's Puzzle in Pay-and-Play Lobbying," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(3), pages 368-389, November.
    11. Hye Young You, 2023. "Dynamic lobbying: Evidence from foreign lobbying in the U.S. Congress," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(2), pages 445-469, July.

  4. Thomas Groll & Christopher J. Ellis, 2013. "Dynamic Commercial Lobbying," CESifo Working Paper Series 4114, CESifo.

    Cited by:

    1. Groll, Thomas & Ellis, Christopher J., 2014. "A simple model of the commercial lobbying industry," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 299-316.

  5. Thomas Groll & Christopher J. Ellis, 2013. "A Simple Model of the Commercial Lobbying Industry," CESifo Working Paper Series 4110, CESifo.

    Cited by:

    1. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2020. "Subpoena power and informational lobbying," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 32(2), pages 188-234, April.
    2. Elias Asproudis & Nadeem Khan & Nada Korac-Kakabadse, 2019. "Game of Regional Environmental Policy: Europe and US," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 1-20, March.
    3. David P Baron, 2019. "Lobbying dynamics," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 31(3), pages 403-452, July.
    4. P. Roberti, 2016. "Citizens or lobbies: who controls policy?," Working Papers wp1085, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    5. Matilde Bombardini & Francesco Trebbi, 2019. "Empirical Models of Lobbying," NBER Working Papers 26287, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Groll, Thomas & Ellis, Christopher J., 2014. "A simple model of the commercial lobbying industry," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 299-316.
    7. Thomas Groll & Christopher J. Ellis, 2016. "Repeated Lobbying by Commercial Lobbyists and Special Interests," CESifo Working Paper Series 5809, CESifo.
    8. Hiroaki Yamagami & Ryo Arawatari & Takeo Hori, 2019. "Ambitious Emissions Goal as a Strategic Preemption," Working Papers 2019.13, FAERE - French Association of Environmental and Resource Economists.
    9. Oliver Huwyler, 2020. "Interest groups in the European Union and their hiring of political consultancies," European Union Politics, , vol. 21(2), pages 333-354, June.
    10. Brittany Feor & Blair Long & Eric Richert, 2018. "Who Uses Commercial Lobbying Firms," Working Paper 1409, Economics Department, Queen's University.
    11. Greiner, Michael & Kim, Jaemin & Cordon Thor, Jennifer, 2023. "CEO values as antecedents to corporate political activity: An empirical exploration," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 160(C).
    12. Schnakenberg, Keith & Turner, Ian R, 2023. "Formal Theories of Special Interest Influence," SocArXiv 47e26, Center for Open Science.
    13. Martin Gregor, 2016. "Tullock's Puzzle in Pay-and-Play Lobbying," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(3), pages 368-389, November.
    14. Hye Young You, 2023. "Dynamic lobbying: Evidence from foreign lobbying in the U.S. Congress," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(2), pages 445-469, July.
    15. Thomas Groll & Christopher J. Ellis, 2013. "Dynamic Commercial Lobbying," CESifo Working Paper Series 4114, CESifo.
    16. Martin Gregor, 2014. "Access fees for competing lobbies," Working Papers IES 2014/22, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Jul 2014.

  6. Thomas Groll & Peter J. Lambert, 2011. "The pro-poorness, growth and inequality nexus: Some findings from a simulation study," Working Papers 214, ECINEQ, Society for the Study of Economic Inequality.

    Cited by:

    1. Francisco Azpitarte, 2014. "Was Pro-Poor Economic Growth in Australia for the Income-Poor? And for the Multidimensionally-Poor?," Social Indicators Research: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal for Quality-of-Life Measurement, Springer, vol. 117(3), pages 871-905, July.
    2. Sean Higgins & Nora Lustig, 2015. "Can a poverty-reducing and progressive tax and transfer system hurt the poor?," Working Papers 363, ECINEQ, Society for the Study of Economic Inequality.

Articles

  1. Groll, Thomas & O’Halloran, Sharyn & McAllister, Geraldine, 2021. "Delegation and the regulation of U.S. financial markets," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).

    Cited by:

    1. Guangyu Mu & Yuhan Wang & Nan Gao & Xiurong Li, 2023. "A Novel Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model for Internet Consumer Financial Regulation," SAGE Open, , vol. 13(3), pages 21582440231, August.

  2. Ellis, Christopher J. & Groll, Thomas, 2020. "Strategic Legislative Subsidies: Informational Lobbying and the Cost of Policy," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 114(1), pages 179-205, February.

    Cited by:

    1. Schnakenberg, Keith & Schumock, Collin & Turner, Ian R, 2023. "Dark Money and Voter Learning," SocArXiv r562d, Center for Open Science.
    2. Christopher J. Ellis & Thomas Groll, 2018. "Who Lobbies Whom? Special Interests and Hired Guns," CESifo Working Paper Series 7367, CESifo.
    3. Thomas Groll & Christopher J. Ellis, 2016. "Repeated Lobbying by Commercial Lobbyists and Special Interests," CESifo Working Paper Series 5809, CESifo.
    4. Fehrler, Sebastian & Schneider, Maik T., 2021. "Buying supermajorities in the lab," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 113-154.
    5. Dellis, Arnaud, 2023. "Legislative informational lobbying," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
    6. Stefano Barbieri & Kai A. Konrad & David A. Malueg, 2019. "Preemption contests between groups," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2019-09, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
    7. Clement Minaudier, 2022. "The Value of Confidential Policy Information: Persuasion, Transparency, and Influence," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(2), pages 570-612.
    8. Blumenthal, Benjamin, 2021. "Political Agency and Legislative Subsidies with Imperfect Monitoring," SocArXiv ydfbs, Center for Open Science.
    9. Schnakenberg, Keith & Turner, Ian R, 2023. "Formal Theories of Special Interest Influence," SocArXiv 47e26, Center for Open Science.
    10. Hye Young You, 2023. "Dynamic lobbying: Evidence from foreign lobbying in the U.S. Congress," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(2), pages 445-469, July.
    11. Zerbini, Antoine, 2023. "The Case for Lobbying Transparency," SocArXiv w6vam, Center for Open Science.
    12. Schnakenberg, Keith & Turner, Ian R, 2019. "Signaling with Reform: How the Threat of Corruption Prevents Informed Policymaking," SocArXiv jkvz6, Center for Open Science.

  3. Thomas Groll & Christopher J. Ellis, 2017. "Repeated Lobbying By Commercial Lobbyists And Special Interests," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(4), pages 1868-1897, October.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  4. Thomas Groll & Maggie McKinley, 2015. "Modern Lobbying: A Relationship Market," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 13(03), pages 15-22, October.

    Cited by:

    1. Yuting Gao, 2022. "Lobbying for Trade Liberalization and its Policy Influence," CAEPR Working Papers 2022-006 Classification-D, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Department of Economics, Indiana University Bloomington.
    2. d'Este, Rocco & Draca, Mirko & Fons-Rosen, Christian, 2023. "Shadow Lobbyists," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 652, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    3. Christopher J. Ellis & Thomas Groll, 2018. "Who Lobbies Whom? Special Interests and Hired Guns," CESifo Working Paper Series 7367, CESifo.
    4. Stefano Barbieri & Kai A. Konrad & David A. Malueg, 2019. "Preemption contests between groups," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2019-09, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
    5. Fernandez-Osorio, Andres Eduardo & Miron, Marina & Cabrera-Cabrera, Leidy Johana & Corcione-Nieto, Maria Antonieta & Villalba-Garcia, Luisa Fernanda, 2023. "Towards an effective gender integration in the armed forces: The case of the Colombian Army Military Academy," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 171(C).

  5. Groll, Thomas & Ellis, Christopher J., 2014. "A simple model of the commercial lobbying industry," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 299-316.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  6. Thomas Groll & Peter J. Lambert, 2013. "The Pro-Poorness, Growth and Inequality Nexus: Some Findings From a Simulation Study," Review of Income and Wealth, International Association for Research in Income and Wealth, vol. 59(4), pages 776-784, December.
    See citations under working paper version above.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 5 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (3) 2012-02-20 2017-01-08 2018-09-24
  2. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (3) 2017-01-08 2018-09-24 2018-12-24
  3. NEP-POL: Positive Political Economics (3) 2017-01-08 2018-09-24 2018-12-24
  4. NEP-NET: Network Economics (2) 2017-01-08 2018-09-24
  5. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (1) 2018-12-24
  6. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (1) 2018-09-24
  7. NEP-LTV: Unemployment, Inequality and Poverty (1) 2011-09-16

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