IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/eeupol/v21y2020i2p333-354.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Interest groups in the European Union and their hiring of political consultancies

Author

Listed:
  • Oliver Huwyler

Abstract

Interest groups do not only attempt to influence European legislation by devising and executing their own strategies, or relying on their allies. Almost 50% have also experience in hiring political consultants. Using novel survey data from the policy formulation stage, this study shows that business interest groups are more likely to hire consultancies than non-business interest groups. It suggests that business associations’ higher likelihood of hiring consultancies is linked to membership promotion. For firms, it likely relates to their need for specialised lobbying tools and trust-building measures when seeking private goods from policy-makers. Furthermore, the results indicate that consultancy hiring by business interest groups becomes less likely the more they focus on lobbying. This moderation effect highlights that business interest groups show awareness of principal–agent problems and take mitigating action.

Suggested Citation

  • Oliver Huwyler, 2020. "Interest groups in the European Union and their hiring of political consultancies," European Union Politics, , vol. 21(2), pages 333-354, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:21:y:2020:i:2:p:333-354
    DOI: 10.1177/1465116519897820
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1465116519897820
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/1465116519897820?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Groll, Thomas & Ellis, Christopher J., 2014. "A simple model of the commercial lobbying industry," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 299-316.
    2. Brasher Holly & Lowery David, 2006. "The Corporate Context of Lobbying Activity," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-25, April.
    3. Tversky, Amos & Kahneman, Daniel, 1992. "Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 5(4), pages 297-323, October.
    4. Thomas Groll & Christopher J. Ellis, 2017. "Repeated Lobbying By Commercial Lobbyists And Special Interests," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(4), pages 1868-1897, October.
    5. Alberto Abadie & Susan Athey & Guido W Imbens & Jeffrey M Wooldridge, 2023. "When Should You Adjust Standard Errors for Clustering?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 138(1), pages 1-35.
    6. Christopher J. Ellis & Thomas Groll, 2018. "Who Lobbies Whom? Special Interests and Hired Guns," CESifo Working Paper Series 7367, CESifo.
    7. Anne Binderkrantz, 2005. "Interest Group Strategies: Navigating Between Privileged Access and Strategies of Pressure," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 53, pages 694-715, December.
    8. Hansen, Wendy L. & Mitchell, Neil J., 2000. "Disaggregating and Explaining Corporate Political Activity: Domestic and Foreign Corporations in National Politics," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 94(4), pages 891-903, December.
    9. Christine Quittkat, 2011. "The European Commission's Online Consultations: A Success Story?," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(3), pages 653-674, May.
    10. Wendy L. Hansen & Neil J. Mitchell & Jeffrey M. Drope, 2005. "The Logic of Private and Collective Action," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 49(1), pages 150-167, January.
    11. Christine Mahoney & Michael J. Beckstrand, 2011. "Following the Money: European Union Funding of Civil Society Organizations," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(6), pages 1339-1361, November.
    12. Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-795, December.
    13. Marianne Bertrand & Matilde Bombardini & Francesco Trebbi, 2014. "Is It Whom You Know or What You Know? An Empirical Assessment of the Lobbying Process," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(12), pages 3885-3920, December.
    14. Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April.
    15. Alex Warleigh, 2001. "‘Europeanizing’ Civil Society: NGOs as Agents of Political Socialization," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(4), pages 619-639, November.
    16. Anne Binderkrantz, 2005. "Interest Group Strategies: Navigating Between Privileged Access and Strategies of Pressure," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 53(4), pages 694-715, December.
    17. Rosa Sanchez Salgado, 2014. "Rebalancing EU Interest Representation? Associative Democracy and EU Funding of Civil Society Organizations," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(2), pages 337-353, March.
    18. Brasher, Holly & Lowery, David, 2006. "The Corporate Context of Lobbying Activity," Business and Politics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 8(1), pages 1-23, April.
    19. Rainer Eising, 2007. "Institutional Context, Organizational Resources and Strategic Choices," European Union Politics, , vol. 8(3), pages 329-362, September.
    20. Potters, Jan & van Winden, Frans, 1992. "Lobbying and Asymmetric Information," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 74(3), pages 269-292, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Panagiota Papadimitri & Ansgar Wohlschlegel, 2020. "Lobbying and Enforcement: Theory and Application to Bank Regulation," Working Papers 2020-01, Swansea University, School of Management.
    2. Patrick Bernhagen & Neil J. Mitchell, 2009. "The Determinants of Direct Corporate Lobbying in the European Union," European Union Politics, , vol. 10(2), pages 155-176, June.
    3. Kim Jin-Hyuk, 2008. "Corporate Lobbying Revisited," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(2), pages 1-25, September.
    4. Panagiota Papadimitri & Ansgar Wohlschlegel, 2019. "Lobbying, Regulatory Enforcement and Corporate Governance: Theory and Evidence from Regulatory Enforcement Actions against US Banks," Working Papers in Economics & Finance 2019-08, University of Portsmouth, Portsmouth Business School, Economics and Finance Subject Group.
    5. Lynn Bennie & Patrick Bernhagen & Neil J. Mitchell, 2007. "The Logic of Transnational Action: The Good Corporation and the Global Compact," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 55(4), pages 733-753, December.
    6. Francesca Colli & Johan Adriaensen, 2020. "Lobbying the state or the market? A framework to study civil society organizations’ strategic behavior," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 14(3), pages 501-513, July.
    7. Bombardini, Matilde & Trebbi, Francesco, 2012. "Competition and political organization: Together or alone in lobbying for trade policy?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 18-26.
    8. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2020. "Subpoena power and informational lobbying," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 32(2), pages 188-234, April.
    9. Groll, Thomas & Ellis, Christopher J., 2014. "A simple model of the commercial lobbying industry," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 299-316.
    10. Thomas Groll & Christopher J. Ellis, 2017. "Repeated Lobbying By Commercial Lobbyists And Special Interests," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(4), pages 1868-1897, October.
    11. Naciye Bey, 2022. "Configurational analysis of environmental NGOs and their influence on environmental policy in Turkey," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 9(1), pages 1-12, December.
    12. Adelino, Manuel & Dinc, I. Serdar, 2014. "Corporate distress and lobbying: Evidence from the Stimulus Act," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(2), pages 256-272.
    13. Nicole Bolleyer, 2021. "Civil society – Politically engaged or member-serving? A governance perspective," European Union Politics, , vol. 22(3), pages 495-520, September.
    14. Brittany Feor & Blair Long & Eric Richert, 2018. "Who Uses Commercial Lobbying Firms," Working Paper 1409, Economics Department, Queen's University.
    15. Adam W Chalmers, 2013. "With a lot of help from their friends: Explaining the social logic of informational lobbying in the European Union," European Union Politics, , vol. 14(4), pages 475-496, December.
    16. Hye Young You, 2023. "Dynamic lobbying: Evidence from foreign lobbying in the U.S. Congress," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(2), pages 445-469, July.
    17. David P Baron, 2019. "Lobbying dynamics," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 31(3), pages 403-452, July.
    18. Matilde Bombardini & Francesco Trebbi, 2020. "Empirical Models of Lobbying," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 12(1), pages 391-413, August.
    19. Danny Zhao‐Xiang Huang, 2022. "Environmental, social and governance factors and assessing firm value: valuation, signalling and stakeholder perspectives," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 62(S1), pages 1983-2010, April.
    20. Thomas Groll & Christopher J. Ellis, 2013. "Dynamic Commercial Lobbying," CESifo Working Paper Series 4114, CESifo.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:21:y:2020:i:2:p:333-354. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.