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Interest Group Strategies: Navigating Between Privileged Access and Strategies of Pressure

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  • Anne Binderkrantz

Abstract

The literature often contrasts interest groups possessing insider status and outsider groups forced to seek influence through more indirect means. Drawing on data from a survey of all national Danish interest groups, this article demonstrates that most groups have an action repertoire including both direct contacts to bureaucrats and parliamentarians and indirect activities such as media campaigns and mobilizations of members. Different strategies of influence are correlated positively, hence, there is no contradiction between pursuing strategies associated with insider access to decision‐making and strategies where pressure is put on decision makers through media contacts and mobilizations. An analysis of four distinct strategies – an administrative, a parliamentary, a media and a mobilization strategy – finds interesting variations in the factors that affect the pursuance of the various strategies of influence. Groups with a privileged position vis‐à‐vis decision makers have high levels of activities targeting these decision makers, but the lack of a privileged position does not lead groups to pursue indirect strategies. Indirect strategies are most intensively pursued by cause groups and groups who find themselves in a competitive situation with regard to attracting members.

Suggested Citation

  • Anne Binderkrantz, 2005. "Interest Group Strategies: Navigating Between Privileged Access and Strategies of Pressure," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 53(4), pages 694-715, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:polstu:v:53:y:2005:i:4:p:694-715
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2005.00552.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jeremy Richardson, 2000. "Government, Interest Groups and Policy Change," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 48(5), pages 1006-1025, December.
    2. Maloney, William A. & Jordan, Grant & McLaughlin, Andrew M., 1994. "Interest Groups and Public Policy: The Insider/Outsider Model Revisited," Journal of Public Policy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 14(1), pages 17-38, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lasse F. Henriksen & Jacob Lunding & Christoph H. Ellersgaard & Anton G. Larsen, 2025. "The hardcore brokers: Core-periphery structure and political representation in Denmark's corporate elite network," Papers 2501.17209, arXiv.org.
    2. repec:osf:osfxxx:f6t5y_v1 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Coban, Mehmet Kerem, 2020. "Diffuse interest groups and regulatory policy change: Financial consumer protection in Turkey," OSF Preprints f6t5y, Center for Open Science.
    4. Mireille Chiroleu-Assouline & Thomas P. Lyon, 2016. "Merchants of Doubt: Corporate Political Influence when Expert Credibility is Uncertain," Working Papers 2016.28, FAERE - French Association of Environmental and Resource Economists.
    5. Max Grömping & Darren R. Halpin, 2021. "Do think tanks generate media attention on issues they care about? Mediating internal expertise and prevailing governmental agendas," Policy Sciences, Springer;Society of Policy Sciences, vol. 54(4), pages 849-866, December.
    6. Naciye Bey, 2022. "Configurational analysis of environmental NGOs and their influence on environmental policy in Turkey," Humanities and Social Sciences Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 9(1), pages 1-12, December.
    7. Danica Fink-Hafner & Sara Bauman, 2023. "Interest Group Strategic Responses to Democratic Backsliding," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 11(1), pages 39-49.
    8. David Coen & Alexander Katsaitis, 2021. "Lobbying Brexit Negotiations: Who Lobbies Michel Barnier?," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 9(1), pages 37-47.
    9. Nicole Bolleyer, 2021. "Civil society – Politically engaged or member-serving? A governance perspective," European Union Politics, , vol. 22(3), pages 495-520, September.
    10. Francesca Colli & Johan Adriaensen, 2020. "Lobbying the state or the market? A framework to study civil society organizations’ strategic behavior," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 14(3), pages 501-513, July.
    11. Pankaj K. P. Shreyaskar & Mrinalini Pandey & Pramod Pathak, 2026. "Factors Affecting Lobbying: Illustrations From India," Vision, , vol. 30(1), pages 110-120, February.
    12. Keller, Eileen, 2015. "Forging a new Mittelstand compromise : lobbying strategies and business influence after the financial crisis," Economics Working Papers MWP2015/19, European University Institute.
    13. Gamboa, Ricardo, 2013. "Interest groups in foreign trade negotiations: Chile, Colombia and Peru in a comparative perspective," Papers 919, World Trade Institute.
    14. M. Kerem Coban, 2024. "Rethinking de facto autonomy? A multi‐policy area approach and the regulatory policy process," Review of Policy Research, Policy Studies Organization, vol. 41(3), pages 508-530, May.
    15. David Coen & Alexander Katsaitis, 2021. "Lobbying Brexit Negotiations: Who Lobbies Michel Barnier?," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 9(1), pages 37-47.
    16. Adam W Chalmers, 2013. "With a lot of help from their friends: Explaining the social logic of informational lobbying in the European Union," European Union Politics, , vol. 14(4), pages 475-496, December.
    17. Nayara F. Macedo de Medeiros Albrecht, 2023. "Bureaucrats, interest groups and policymaking: a comprehensive overview from the turn of the century," Humanities and Social Sciences Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 10(1), pages 1-10, December.
    18. Glatz, Annika, 2013. "Interest Groups in International Intellectual Property Negotiations," Papers 928, World Trade Institute.
    19. Oliver Huwyler, 2020. "Interest groups in the European Union and their hiring of political consultancies," European Union Politics, , vol. 21(2), pages 333-354, June.
    20. Azad Bali & Darren Halpin, 2021. "Agenda-setting instruments: means and strategies for the management of policy demands [Mayflies and old bulls: Organization persistence in state interest communities]," Policy and Society, Darryl S. Jarvis and M. Ramesh, vol. 40(3), pages 333-344.
    21. Schroeder, Wolfgang & Speidel, Frederic & Zindel, Jannik, 2024. "Mobilität und Korporatismus: Die Transformation der Automobilindustrie und ihre Akteure," EconStor Open Access Book Chapters, in: Handbuch Mobilität und Gesellschaft, pages 1-16, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    22. Danica Fink-Hafner & Sara Bauman, 2023. "Interest Group Strategic Responses to Democratic Backsliding," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 11(1), pages 39-49.
    23. Paul Cairney & Federico Toth, 2023. "The politics of COVID-19 experts: comparing winners and losers in Italy and the UK," Policy and Society, Darryl S. Jarvis and M. Ramesh, vol. 42(3), pages 392-405.
    24. Peter Aagaard, 2022. "A Price to Pay? The Backsides of the Privileged Access to the Political System," Public Organization Review, Springer, vol. 22(4), pages 1157-1171, December.

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