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Agenda-setting instruments: means and strategies for the management of policy demands
[Mayflies and old bulls: Organization persistence in state interest communities]

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Listed:
  • Azad Bali
  • Darren Halpin

Abstract

Students of public policy have spent considerable effort setting out the types of policy instruments or tools available to policymakers in different stages of the policy process. A nascent strand of this important work concerns the agend-asetting phase, where scholars aim to understand the instruments – procedural and substantive – that government uses to shape the issues that it has to address. There is however limited engagement between scholarship on interest groups and this ongoing discussion around agenda-setting tools. This paper aims to fill this gap by identifying different types of agenda-setting tools deployed by government which are used to shape engagement from organised interests. These tools are classified as those which governments use to routinise demands, regularise demands, generate demands, and impose issues onto the agenda. The paper refocuses attention of policy scholars onto the means and strategies that policymakers deploy to manage government agendas, a process which has clear implications for what becomes a policy problem and thereafter potentially subject to governmental action.

Suggested Citation

  • Azad Bali & Darren Halpin, 2021. "Agenda-setting instruments: means and strategies for the management of policy demands [Mayflies and old bulls: Organization persistence in state interest communities]," Policy and Society, Darryl S. Jarvis and M. Ramesh, vol. 40(3), pages 333-344.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:polsoc:v:40:y:2021:i:3:p:333-344.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/14494035.2021.1955489
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    References listed on IDEAS

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